**Ministry of the Interior**
Finland

# NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM 2019–2023

Government resolution
19 December 2019

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# Description sheet

**Abstract**

Violent radicalisation and extremism are a cross-border threat to safety and security, sense of security, people's well-being and sense of participation, democracy as well as human and fundamental rights.

The National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism was prepared in broad cooperation with the authorities (national and local authorities), organisations, communities and researchers.

The results and recommendations of the outside assessment, published in April 2019, of the earlier Action Plan, which was confirmed in 2016, have been taken into consideration in the current Action Plan. The goals as well as the target areas and measures of the operation are defined in the Action Plan. In addition, the Action Plan defines measures through which the police, reception centres, social and health services as well as the education sector develop their capabilities to prevent violent radicalisation.

# Kuvailulehti

**Tiivistelmä**

Väkivaltainen radikalisoituminen ja ekstremismi on rajat ylittävä uhka turvallisuudelle, turvallisuuden tunteelle, ihmisten hyvinvoinnille ja osallisuuden tunteelle, demokratialle sekä ihmis- ja perusoikeuksille.

Kansallinen väkivaltaisen radikalisoitumisen ja ekstremismin ennalta ehkäisyn toimenpideohjelma on valmisteltu laajassa yhteistyössä viranomaisten (kansalliset ja paikalliset viranomaiset), järjestöjen, yhteisöjen ja tutkijoidenkanssa.

Toimenpideohjelmassa on otettu huomioon edellisen, vuonna 2016 vahvistetun toimenpideohjelman ulkopuolisen arvioinnin tulokset ja suositukset, jotka julkaistiin huhtikuussa 2019. Ohjelmassa on määritelty tavoitteet sekä toiminnan kohdealueet ja toimenpiteet. Lisäksi ohjelmassa on määritelty toimenpiteet, joilla poliisi, vastaanottokeskukset, sosiaali- ja terveystoimi sekä opetustoimi kehittävät valmiuksiaan ennalta ehkäistä väkivaltaista radikalisoitumista.

# Presentationsblad

**Referat**

Våldsbejakande radikalisering och extremism utgör ett gränsöverskridande hot mot säkerheten, trygghetskänslan, människors välfärd och känsla av delaktighet, demokratin samt de mänskliga och grundläggande rättigheterna.

Det nationella åtgärdsprogrammet för förebyggande av våldsbejakande radikalisering och extremism har utarbetats i brett samarbete mellan myndigheter (nationella och lokala), organisationer, sammanslutningar och forskare.

I åtgärdsprogrammet har vi beaktat resultaten och rekommendationerna från den externa utvärderingen av det föregående åtgärdsprogrammet, som fastställdes 2016. Resultaten och rekommendationerna publicerades i april 2019. I programmet fastställs målen samt målområdena och åtgärderna för verksamheten. Dessutom fastställs i programmet de åtgärder genom vilka polisen, förläggningarna, social- och hälsovårdsväsendet samt undervisningsväsendet utvecklar sin beredskap att förebygga våldsbejakande radikalisering.

# Contents

## INTRODUCTION

Violent radicalisation and extremism have always existed, although the terms used have varied at different times. In Finland, violent extremism was quite visible until the Second World War, after which extremist groups seldom took any visible action. However, due to international developments, the situation in Finland gradually began to change in the 2000s, and violent radicalisation and extremism have been a growing phenomenon also in Finland in the 2010s. The development of violent extremism in Finland has been described in the reviews of violent extremism regularly published by the Ministry of the Interior, which are available on the Ministry of the Interior's website[1].

Violent radicalisation and extremism are a threat to security, the sense of security, people's wellbeing and the sense of participation, democracy as well as human and fundamental rights. The effects of related acts are always broader than those of single acts. The prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is a shared task for the whole of society, and different authorities and civil society are jointly responsible for it. This is the only way to combat the related complex and changing threat and maintain in Finland an open society in which diverse groups of people can live peacefully side by side.

The National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism was prepared in broad cooperation with the authorities (national and local authorities), organisations and communities. Researchers were also involved in the preparatory work. The National Cooperation Network acted as the steering group for preparing the action plan, the content of which was prepared in workshops. A list of the experts who participated in the preparation work is provided in Appendix 1.

The results and recommendations of the external assessment of the previous Action Plan, which was confirmed in 2016, have been taken into consideration in preparing the current Action Plan. The results and recommendations of the assessment were published in April

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1    Website of the Ministry of the Interior intermin.fi/vastuualueet/poliisiasiat/väkivaltainen radikalisoituminen.

2019[2]. The experiences introduced by the broad group of experts who participated in the preparation work, as well as good practices concerning the work done, were taken into consideration in the objectives and measures.

The work done in Finland to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism has also been assessed by the United Nations (UN). The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) carried out a country assessment in April 2019, in which it assessed how Finland has implemented UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014)[3]. In its assessment, the Directorate praised the broad cooperation carried out in Finland and the fact that the authorities, civil society and communities in the country all contribute to the prevention of violent radicalisation. In addition, the implementation of an external assessment of the 2016 Action Plan was considered highly positive. Finland was also praised for its preventive actions, in which measures to deal with people returning from the conflict areas in Syria and Iraq have been planned well in advance before the activation of the situation[4]. Anchor work was seen as a good practice, and measures taken in the education sector to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism received praise.

In the European Union, the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism has been developed by the European Commission. In the summer 2018, the Council accepted a high-level report[5] that describes the EU's common priorities for preventive work as well as a structure through which the EU supports the work done in the Member States and coordinates different functions. The implementation of the recommendations presented in the high-level report and the effectiveness of the coordination structure were assessed in the EU together with the Member States at the end of 2019. Where necessary, operations within the EU's structures will be reviewed on the basis of the assessment.

The objective of preventing violent radicalisation and extremism in Finland is that the actions to be implemented are based on researched information. Research into the phenomenon has increased and a large number of research papers have been published on the subject internationally and in Finland in the last few years. Research and its results have been utilised in preparing the Action Plan, and the participation of researchers in the work has supported research-based operations. The information and observations found in the reports and investigations published in the last few years have been taken into consideration in the content of this Action Plan. One of the reports and investigations

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2    Assessment of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism of the Ministry of the Interior. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:18.

3    The UN resolutions are found at www.un.org/resolutions-0.

4    Proposal for arranging cooperation between the authorities to deal with returnees from conflict areas.

5    High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R). Final Report 18 May 2018.

is the report[6] prepared by the Safety Investigation Authority regarding the stabbings that occurred in Turku on 18 August 2018, explaining how the incident unfolded, its causes and consequences as well as stating recommendations for the development of actions in response. On the basis of the report, the Ministry of the Interior launched a project in which case management between the police and other authorities was developed for situations where a person has become or is at risk of becoming radicalised[7]. Measures that implement the recommendations of the report have been attached to this Action Plan. Multi-professional Anchor work is an important element in preventing violent radicalisation. The Anchor manual[8], which supports the operations of the Anchor teams to prevent violent radicalisation, was prepared in collaboration with the Ministry of the Interior, the National Police Board and the University of Eastern Finland in a project funded by the EU Internal Security Fund.

The purpose of this Action Plan is to describe the joint national strategy guiding the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism and to set out the related objectives and measures. Some of the objectives and measures describe actions in cross-sectoral entities, and some of the objectives and measures of different actors. The cross-sectoral entities were prepared by the experts in these sectors. The Action Plan is not an exhaustive manual or handbook, but rather provides information of relevance to prevention. A number of actors at the national, regional and local levels participate in the implementation of the Action Plan, which is intended to serve all of them.

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6    Turku stabbings 18 August 2018. Safety Investigation Authority, P2017-01.

7    Observations about the case management interface and recommendations for the development of operations. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:17.

8    Anchor manual. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:16.

# 1   Background and grounds for the work

Violent extremism and the operation of extremist movements are a threat to democracy, human and fundamental rights, social order and people's safety and sense of security.

The Constitution of Finland secures the inviolability of human dignity and the freedoms and rights of individuals, and it promotes a fair society. The prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is related to the realisation of equality guaranteed under the Constitution, according to which, no one may, without valid reasons, be treated differently on the grounds of their origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion or other personal characteristic. The Constitution guarantees not only personal freedom and integrity but also freedom of religion and freedom of speech. In general, the ideology of all violent extremist movements is based on the idea that people and groups of people are in a different position depending on the human dignity they have. Violent extremist movements divide people into friends and enemies, and the use of violence towards individuals and groups defined as enemies is permitted, desirable and sometimes even an obligation. Violent extremist movements seek to limit freedom of speech by imposing pressure and sometimes also violence and the threat of violence towards individuals who present opinions and views that are "wrong" from the group's ideological viewpoint or criticise the activities and ideology of the extremist group in question.

In Finland, violent radicalisation and extremism have been prevented systematically since 2012 when the first National Action Plan was confirmed. The second National Action Plan was confirmed in April 2016. The Action Plan was drawn up and implemented through broad cooperation between different authorities and non-governmental organisations. Representatives of civil society also broadly contributed to the work. The implementation of the National Action Plan 2016 was assessed by an external reviser and the assessment report was published in April 2019[9]. This third National Action Plan takes into

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9    Assessment of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism of the Ministry of the Interior. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:18.

consideration the experiences gained from earlier work and the results of the assessment, including its recommendations.

Preventing violent radicalisation and extremism is an important element in promoting equality. In Finland, the focus is on preventive operations that are based on broad cooperation. The National Action Plan guides local and regional work based on a local, up-to-date overview. Regional and local action plans need not be compiled unless there is a special need to do so. Where necessary, different actors can draw up manuals and handbooks supporting and promoting preventive work.

International operations play an important role in preventing violent radicalisation. Violent radicalisation takes place locally, although the factors affecting it are often global and spread across borders. The UN Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism was published in January 2016. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CE) actively contribute to the prevention of violent radicalisation. In the last few years, the European Union (EU) has increased its efforts to prevent violent extremism. The work at the EU level is coordinated and developed by the EU Commission, which will invest EUR 60 million in the work over the next four years. The financial aid supports the work done in the Member States in a variety of ways. Nordic cooperation to prevent violent extremism was launched between the ministries with a cooperation agreement signed in January 2015. A process is currently in progress in which the cooperation network between the ministries and the operation of the Nordic Safe Cities network are combined and the coordinating role of the Nordic Council in the operation is strengthened. Different actors, such as the police, social and health services, as well as the education sector, have their own international networks in which operations are developed.

# 2 The situation concerning violent extremism in Finland and Europe

The prevention of national violent extremism and radicalisation targets all forms of violent extremism in Finland. These include the violent non-parliamentary far right, violent non-parliamentary far left, religiously motivated violent extremism, radical alternative movements as well as individual actors. Individual actors may be motivated by different violent extremist ideologies, and they may not be attached to any particular ideology.

## Violent non-parliamentary far right

The neo-Nazi *Pohjoismainen Vastarintaliike PVL* (Nordic Resistance Movement) is the most visible far right extremist group in Finland. According to estimates, it has about one hundred members who participate in its activities in one way or another[10]. The National Police Board required the abolition of the PVL under the Associations Act, considering it an organisation whose activities run counter to existing laws and good practice. In 2018, the Turku Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Pirkanmaan District Court in 2017 to impose a ban on the PVL and organisations linked to it. The PVL has the right to appeal the decision and the matter is currently being considered by the Supreme Court. While waiting for a final decision, it appears that the PVL will continue its activities under the new name *Kohti vapautta* (Towards Freedom). The organisation continues to spread National Socialist propaganda in the usual way through the internet and distributing flyers. Some of the organisation's active members have established a new association, *Kansan yhtenäisyys ry* (People's Unity), which they seek to register as a political party. During its first year of activities, the association failed to collect the 5,000 supporter cards required for the establishment of a political party. The PVL participates in demonstrations. In a National Socialist demonstration arranged on Finnish Independence Day in 2018, four of the PVL's active members lead the procession carrying swastika flags. The association is

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10  In 2016, the United Kingdom used anti-terrorism laws to ban the activities of the violent far right group National Action. The group has approximately 100 active members. It should be noted by way of comparison that the population of the United Kingdom is over 60 million, while that of Finland is 5.5 million.

suspected of criminal activity, such as incitement to ethnic hatred. There is a high threat of violence with the PVL and its successors because the association considers itself entitled to target violence at people it perceives as enemies. The enemy can be anyone who has a negative attitude towards the association and the National Socialist ideology it represents. The aim of its activities is to arouse fear among people through the use of flags and symbols, for example. The groups which the association acts in opposition to recognise these symbols and the threatening messages connected with them.

Soldiers of Odin, an anti-immigration group, has resumed its activities. In 2019, the organisation had active street-patrolling groups in at least 30 locations. Some citizens consider these patrols a threat. For example, a crime report was filed in connection with patrolling in a shopping centre. Some members of Soldiers of Odin have been suspected of violent crimes.

In the past couple of years, there have been indications that the Soldiers of Odin and the PVL are establishing closer links. The Soldiers of Odin has attended several PVL demonstrations and also expressed in public that it supports the PVL in the matter concerning its abolition. In addition, members of the PVL have occasionally participated in Soldiers of Odin street patrols.

Violent far right groups make efficient use of local incidents that attract a lot of attention and make people upset. A good example of this is the video published by Soldiers of Odin in February 2019 that suggests a threat of violence related to the suspected sexual abuse of minors, a topic that was widely publicised in the media. In the video, the group announced that it would take action to detect persons guilty of sexual crime. The rhetoric and visual air used in the video suggested the introduction of violent action. The material creates and sustains an atmosphere that entitles one to use violence and can act as an incentive for racist hate crime. It also aggravates confrontation locally and creates an atmosphere of fear and suspicion, in which all immigrants are considered responsible for offences committed by individuals. Regional groups inspired by extremist far-right ideology also emerge in Finland occasionally, giving rise to a local security threat, especially in the form of assaults.

The threat of terrorism related to the violent far right has grown in Europe in the last few years. According to a Europol report, arrests related to far-right terrorism are still rare, though their number has increased during the past three years. In Germany in the last few years, extremist violence motivated by the far right has been targeted at, among others, reception centres, mosques as well as government and political actors. Far-right unrest erupted after a stabbing in Chemnitz in 2018, which was committed by a person with an immigrant background. The incident launched large-scale demonstrations. A group of people prepared violent attacks against immigrants and officials. However, the group,

known as Revolution Chemnitz, was detected before it managed to launch the attacks, and its members are suspected of preparing terrorist attacks. In June 2019, a local German politician belonging to the CDU party was murdered at home, and the police suspect that the murder was motivated by far-right ideology. Far-right actors were sentenced to long prison terms in Germany in 2018.

Two people have died in far-right attacks in the United Kingdom since 2016. Both of the attacks were committed by individuals acting alone. In the first attack, an immigration-liberal politician was stabbed. In the second, the attacker drove a car into a crowd in front of a mosque. In the United Kingdom last year, many far-right supporters were sentenced to prison terms for belonging to the National Action organisation, which was ordered to be abolished under the anti-terrorism act in 2016, and for planning politically motivated acts of violence. One of those sentenced had dual citizenship of Finland and the United Kingdom.

Serious attacks using home-made explosives occurred in Sweden at the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017. Two of the attacks were close to reception centres, and one was in front of business premises favoured by left-wing activists. One person was seriously injured in the attacks. The attacks were committed by individuals who support neo-Nazism and were sentenced to unconditional imprisonment.

A nationalist and white supremacist attacked two mosques in Christchurch in New Zealand in March 2019, killing 50 people. The crime is being investigated as a terrorist act. The attacker had published a manifesto on the 8chan website, in which he explained his motives. He published video of the attack directly on Facebook, which was the first time a terrorist attack was streamed directly via the Internet. The video of the killing was also edited with game effects, and the "game" was then shared further. Violent far-right groups make diverse use of the media. The shooting in a mosque in Norway in August 2019 is considered generally and also by the police as a terrorist act. The attacker killed his step-sister before the shooting. The threat of the violent far right to religious communities and their premises is considered to have increased.

## Hate campaigns pursued by anti-immigration actors

The hate campaigns devised by the far right and other anti-immigration actors have become more common in the last few years. The campaigns, which are targeted at the authorities, reporters and researchers, for example, stem from the anti-immigration trend that activated after 2015 and the increase in the number of counter-media websites linked with the phenomenon. The group of actors engaged in hate campaigns is quite small. The activities mainly centre around individuals associated with anti-immigration as well as around MV lehti, a counter-media magazine. However, the phenomenon is boosted by

several anonymous social media profiles. Politicians, officials, reporters and researchers are chosen as the targets of hate campaigns. They all have in common an attempt to intervene in or comment on the activities of the anti-immigration movement. Hate campaigns take a variety of forms. Anti-immigration actors may, for example, comment on their targets with the intention of defaming them or making unfounded statements or claims about them. The personal data of the victims of such harassment can be spread online and slanderous articles about them may be published on counter-media websites. Actors engaged in hate campaigns typically also insult and threaten their targets, such as through social media or email. The aim of hate campaigns is to influence the behaviour of the target and to present that person and the organisation they represent in a negative light, such as unreliable, partial or unprofessional. This can be a very traumatic experience for the person subjected to a hate campaign. This weakens their safety and sense of security as well as weakening trust in society and other people. This, in turn, can serve as a basis for violent radicalisation.

## Violent non-parliamentary far left

Anarchist and anti-fascist radical unrest takes the form of demonstrations opposing the far right, in which aggressive individuals acting alone seek to violently engage the far right. It is estimated that the activities of the radical far left in Finland involve a few dozen people. They are usually able to mobilise at the most about two hundred people at their biggest demonstrations. A more common operating model used by radical anti-fascists in other European countries is attacks against people profiled as supporters of the far right–a trend still quite rare in Finland. Radical anti-fascists mainly operate through the internet instead of taking direct action on the streets. The most typical operating model is publishing information on far-right supporters and far-right events and where they are organised. The purpose is not only to reveal things about the far right but also to put pressure on people to abandon the movement.

In Central and Western Europe, violent far-left extremism takes the form of rioting at demonstrations and violence against far-right supporters. Anarchist riots took place during the G20 protests in Hamburg in 2017. In 2018, the media reported that anarchists had also participated in yellow-vest riots in France. Militant anti-fascist groups, usually known as Antifa or AFA, target systematic violence against people profiled as far-right supporters in many European countries. In Sweden and Germany, for example, the homes of selected people are still attacked, and victims are beaten and threatened every year. Planned assaults and threats in public places are also characteristic of such groups. A particular variety is the far-left terrorism seen in Southern Europe, especially in Greece and Italy. Bomb attacks against political, economic or governmental targets occasionally occur in these countries. Two bomb attacks thought to be the work of anarchists occurred in Greece last year and one in Italy. A new trend in the last few years has been the support

shown by anarchists and anti-fascists for the Kurds. Anarchists from Europe, including Finland, have participated in armed combat against ISIL in Syria. Anarchists also oppose Turkey, which they consider a fascist state, and the repression it exercises against the Kurds.

It is estimated in many European countries that the threat related to the violent far left has the potential to increase.

## Radical alternative groups

Actions taken by radical alternative groups have been scarce after 2016 when the movement against the planned nuclear power station in Pyhäjoki weakened. The protest, which lasted for about two years and even developed violent features, ended in April 2016 when the police removed demonstrators from close to the site. Signs of the activation of radical environmentalism again appeared at the beginning of 2019 when several demonstrations were arranged close to the mine in Valkeakoski. As a rule, however, the principles of non-violent civil disobedience have been followed at the demonstrations.

## Religiously motivated violent extremism

The terrorism threat level in Finland is at the second lowest level of 2 (elevated) on a four-level scale. The terrorist organisation ISIL considers Finland a justified terrorism target. The threat of terrorism in Finland is primarily attributed to individual actors or groups fostering radical Islamist ideology or promoting its ambitions. There were 370 people subject to anti-terrorism surveillance. The number of such people has almost doubled in a few years as a result of the activation of recruitment and facilitation networks connected with the conflict in Syria and Iraq and the foreign combatant phenomenon.

Travelling to Iraq and Syria came to an almost complete halt after 2015, and the number of returnees from the area has remained almost the same, i.e. at about 20. The authorities have identified more than 80 adults who have travelled to the area from Finland. Children were also taken to the area. Finland has prepared for the arrival of returnees from the conflict area by developing operations based on cooperation between the authorities[11]. The operations have been further developed since March 2019 by preparing for the return to Finland of individuals or groups from the Al-Holi camp, which is maintained by the Kurds, either assisted or independently.

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11  Proposal for arranging cooperation between the authorities to deal with returnees from conflict areas, Ministry of the Interior publications, 11/2017. The Ministerial Working Group for Internal Security and Justice approved the proposal in April 2017.

From the point of view of future trends in religiously motivated violent extremism and prevention, there is concern about the 600 children of anti-terrorism targets. Of the children, about 30 were taken to areas controlled by ISIL in Syria and Iraq, and more children were born there. The degree to which the children have been exposed to the radicalising influence of their parents may vary. For terrorist organisations, children represent the future and the continuation of the ideology.

ISIL is still a threat in spite of having lost its territory in Syria and Iraq. ISIL and its supporters are still spreading material instigating violence over the internet. In Finland, the amount of such material has been small by international standards, although the volume of online communication related to Finland was larger than ever for a couple of years after 2014. Finns appeared in ISIL's materials, and ISIL supporters in Finland produced and distributed material.  Propaganda instigating terrorism has moved to closed platforms since 2016. This is due to technology companies starting to remove such material more efficiently.

The threat of religiously motivated violent extremism is increased by possible returnees from the conflict area in Syria and Iraq as well as the group made up by radicalised people in Finland. The returnees, who are still committed to ISIL's ideology, can serve as an example and role model for others and instigate them to violent acts.

Religiously motivated violent extremism and the related terrorism are still the biggest terrorism threat in Europe[12]. A total of 13 people were killed in attacks in 2018, and the authorities prevented 16 attacks. According to Europol, people with a criminal background, including those serving a sentence, are a special risk group because they are subjected to indoctrination by terrorist groups.

Al-Qaida was weakened after the death of Osama Bin Laden. However, it has endeavoured to increase its influence in the last few years by again establishing relations with regional actors. It still aims to launch attacks in Europe and the United States.

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12  European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019. Europol.

# 3 Violent radicalisation and extremism – national definitions

There is no established international definition for violent radicalisation and extremism. In Finland, work is based on a definition that was confirmed in the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 2016. Those definitions are also used in this Action Plan.

The following definitions are used in Finland:

**Violent extremism** refers to using, threatening with, instigating, encouraging or justifying violence based on ideological grounds. Violent extremism is not a concept used in criminal law. Extremist violence is not necessarily subversive and is often targeted at a group or individuals defined as enemies. It causes fear and a sense of insecurity locally, as in single city districts or residential areas, and can also be targeted at property. Crime motivated by hate and/or racism (hate crime) can also be extremist when it is motivated by a whole ideology.

**Violent radicalisation** is a process through which individuals end up using or threatening the use of violence, urging someone to commit acts of violence or justifying it on ideological grounds. During the radicalisation process, the individual begins to accept and favour violence, regardless of the ideology or stimuli adopted from different ideologies that they use to justify violence. There are always multiple reasons behind radicalisation, and radicalised people do not share a single common profile. Factors underlying radicalisation have been investigated quite extensively and they are usually connected with social factors and factors related to the individual. These factors can also be divided into those that pull and those that push. The social network plays a role, and the individual

may become radicalised as part of the network[13]. Emotions are important in radicalisation, and ideological factors also play a role. Problems with making a living and social exclusion may promote violent radicalisation but do not account for it alone. Situational factors contribute to why some individuals become radicalised and others do not.

**Ideology** in this Action Plan refers to a worldview that is common to a specific group of people and stems from attitudes about groups of people, the world, religion, relations between people and states, human dignity, what is sacred and what is profane as well as corresponding beliefs that constitute a moral compass for an individual.

Terrorism is always a form of violent extremism, but not all violent extremism is terrorism. Crimes committed with terrorist intent are defined in the Criminal Code of Finland (section 34a[14]). Terrorist violence is subversive and targeted at countries or international organisations. Among other things, the purpose of terrorism is to cause serious fear among the population.

An **extremist offence** refers to crime motivated by the ideology of the person committing it. The difference between hate crime and extremist crime is that the former is connected with a specific characteristic of the victim, while the latter is motivated by an entire ideology. All violent crime related to violent extremist groups and the actions of their members is considered extremist violence. The violence exercised by visible extremist groups is instrumental regardless of the target or momentary motive of violence, and the general threat of violence increases the group's ability to create fear. However, violent crimes committed by violent extremist groups and their members are not considered extremist crimes if they clearly have some other motive, such as violence related to other forms of crime, quarrels related to private life or family or domestic violence.

**Target area for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism.** The commonality and popularity of violent extremism is affected by all decisions and measures taken in the various fields of social policy. A successful education policy, healthcare and social welfare policy, employment policy and social planning, for example, can prevent violent radicalisation and extremism. However, if not implemented successfully, they may also create a breeding ground for violent radicalisation and extremism. Promoting wellbeing and preventing social exclusion are important from

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13  Religiously motivated radicalisation and related networks in Finland are described in the Ministry of the Interior publication 2019:14 Malkki & Saarinen. The Jihadist movement in Finland. Far-right actions and groups in Finland are described in the publication "Ulkoparlamentaarinen äärioikeistoliikehdintä ja maahanmuuttovastaisuus 2010-luvun Suomessa" (Non-parliamentary far-right movement and anti-immigration in Finland in the 2010s). Daniel Sallamaa 2018. University of Helsinki, Publications of the Faculty of Social Studies.

14  Criminal Code of Finland, section 34a(1): A person who, with terrorist intent and in a manner that is likely to cause serious harm to a State or an international organisation, makes..."

the point of view of society, though they cannot alone prevent violent radicalisation. In this Action Plan, preventing violent radicalisation and extremism means special actions taken to influence a trend that over the long term may lead to the violent radicalisation of individuals and groups[15]. At its worst, violent radicalisation and extremism can lead to terrorism. This Action Plan does not discuss measures related to combatting terrorism, which have been described in the counter-terrorism strategy[16].

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15  For the Action Plan's target area, see the Ministry of the Interior's Assessment of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:18.

16  National counter-terrorism strategy 2018–2021. Publications of the Ministry of the Interior 23/2018. http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/161182/23_2018_Kansallinen%20 terrorismintorjunnan%20strategia%202018-2021_netti.pdf.

# 4   Finland's strategy for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism

The measures taken by Finland to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism are based on the following strategic guidelines that direct the objectives and measures of preventive operations.

1. The national prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is targeted at all forms of violent extremism occurring in Finland that use violence and instigate or encourage the use of violence in order to achieve their goals. These are: violent far right and far left, religiously motivated violent extremism and radical environmental movements. The activeness of groups and actors varies over time. Preventive measures are also targeted at individual actors whose actions may be motivated by any of the above ideologies or some other motive that fulfills the definition of violent extremism. Individual actors seldom act completely alone and almost always have contacts over the internet with people who share the same ideas.

2. Combatting violent extremism is based on respecting fundamental and human rights and the principles of the rule of law.

3. The prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation is based on information and managing through knowledge. It is essential to increase knowledge about violent extremism and radicalisation as well as effective practices and procedures for their prevention.

4. The prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation is based on cooperation between national and local authorities as well as with non-governmental organisations, communities and researchers. Cooperation may also take the form of multi-professional cooperation, such as Anchor work or other cooperation. This allows sharing a common overview and referring customers from one service provider to another effectively and without interruption.

5. The prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is open cooperation, where interaction between the various actors engaged in the work is important. Interaction builds the confidence required by cooperation. Cooperation ensures that those participating in the work share a common understanding of the phenomenon as well as preventive efforts and their objectives. Openness, exchange of information and knowledge-based operations promote the correct targeting of measures.

6. There are many factors underlying violent radicalisation, making it impossible to define any single profile that would be common to all who are violently radicalised. Therefore, the means for preventing violent radicalisation differ according to the situation and individual in question. Preventing social exclusion is an important form of preventive work in view of people's wellbeing and positive social development, though it is not alone sufficient to prevent violent extremism and radicalisation.  Preventive work makes use of means used by the security authorities, including tools (visible actions by the police, data acquisition and possible pre-trial investigation) and so-called soft tools, such as integration, participation and methods for strengthening control over life, which are implemented, for example, by the authorities responsible for wellbeing services and education. Non-governmental organisations play a key role in view of the above methods as they strengthen people's participation in society, offer channels for influence and promote the social sense of togetherness. The range of tools must be broad in order for prevention to be effective. Different actors have access to different tools, and using these together, separately and coherently allows the development of radicalisation to be interrupted and the reduction of the negative effects of polarisation and confrontation on society.

7. It is important to intervene with individuals, their friends and relatives as well as to provide other forms of support. In this, use is made of the existing basic services, such as healthcare and social welfare services, and multi-professional groups such as Anchor teams. Targeted services are also needed, such as Exit activities for individuals directly affected by violent radicalisation.

8. The participation of young people, women and religious communities in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is strengthened so that their knowledge and competence can be broadly harnessed in the work.

# 5 Parties participating in the implementation of the Action Plan, their duties in prevention and the organisation of activities

## 5.1 National and local organisation of preventive work

National work to prevent violent radicalisation is guided by the Ministerial Working Group on Internal Security and Strengthening the Rule of Law. Nationally, preventive work is developed, coordinated and led by the National Cooperation Network set up by the Ministry of the Interior. The members of the National Cooperation Network represent the key national, regional and local authorities and non-governmental organisations.

At the local level, violent radicalisation and extremism is prevented through cooperation involving different authorities and non-governmental organisations. Violent radicalisation is both a social and a security threat to local people, communities and businesses. Factors promoting violent radicalisation are global, national and local. The effects of violent extremism are seen locally in the environment where people live, where they go to work and school and where they spend their leisure time. Locally, prevention is based on cooperation between different authorities and with non-governmental organisations, permanent multi-professional structures (such as Anchor work) as well as practical interventions and support targeted at individuals at risk of radicalisation or subject to a threat posed by violent extremist groups. Their friends and relatives often need support.

It was decided in the 2019 Government Programme of Prime Minister Antti Rinne that violent radicalisation will be prevented through cooperation between authorities and non-governmental organisations as well as through supporting the work of non-governmental organisations. Non-governmental organisations should be taken into consideration when the authorities organise efforts to prevent violent radicalisation

and extremism nationally, regionally and locally. The Government Programme of Prime Minister Rinne allocated financing to non-governmental organisations' actions to prevent violent radicalisation[17]. Financing is coordinated by the Ministry of Justice and it is intended to promote the implementation of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism. The National Cooperation Network submits an opinion about the project proposals before decisions are made.

## 5.2 Prevention duties of the implementing parties and the organisation of preventive operations

The **Ministry of the Interior** coordinates the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism nationally. The Ministry of the Interior's coordination and management responsibility is based on its statutory duties concerning the National Police Board, maintaining public order and safety and security as well as the police combatting crime. The Ministry of the Interior appoints and leads the National Cooperation Network. Violent extremism seeks to undermine social and public order, which underlines the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior and the police in prevention. The statutory duty of the police is to maintain public order and safety and security. Maintaining public order and security includes all actions taken by the police to create and maintain a safe and pleasant living and operating environment for members of society, combat and prevent disturbances and violations of the law as well as eliminate disturbances and investigate violations of the law. The police are responsible for crime prevention, including terrorism prevention.  At its worst, violent radicalisation and extremism can lead to terrorist acts, so the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is an important element in preventing terrorism. Violent extremism can also be a motive for crime.

The **police** encounter individuals in their work who are becoming or have become violently radicalised or commit crime motivated by violent extremism. Successful encounters between the police, local residents and communities strengthen people's trust in the police and society. At the local level, the police can solve problems that when aggravated could provide a breeding ground for violent radicalisation. All police

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17  The second objective of the Government Programme of Prime Minister Antti Rinne  defines the comprehensive security of society and the prevention of radicalisation. Radicalisation will be prevented through cooperation between authorities and organisations and by supporting the work of organisations. Sufficient financing and guidance for organisations will be ensured to enable them to operate nationwide and on a long-term basis. Details of services will be provided to various authorities so that they can refer persons in need of help to the appropriate support services.

departments carry out organised preventive work[18], which is crucial in preventing violent radicalisation and in related cooperation with other authorities and local communities. Multi-professional Anchor work is implemented in almost all police departments in Finland, intervening in situations, helping customers abandon violent action and referring them to the services of non-governmental organisations and authorities[19]. According to the guidelines of the National Police Board, the preventive actions taken by the police and Anchor are points of contact in case of concern about violent radicalisation. If Anchor work has not yet been started in an area, the contact point is some other designated multi-professional group. The representative of the National Police Board is a member of the National Cooperation Network.

The **Finnish Security and Intelligence Service** has the statutory task of producing, under the guidance of the Ministry of the Interior, information to protect the safety and security of citizens as well as to detect, prevent and expose such operations, undertakings and crime that could threaten state and public order and internal or external safety. The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service focuses on detecting and combatting the most serious threats to national security, such as terrorism, identifying individuals connected with terrorism, maintaining an overview of terrorism as well as updating the national terrorism threat assessment.

It also monitors international trends in terrorism and produces intelligence information and analyses on phenomena threatening national security for the needs of the government and other authorities. To combat terrorism, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service pursues daily cooperation with police departments and other law enforcement authorities as well as international partners. The exchange of information between local police and the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service is important for creating a national and local overview. The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service constantly maintains and develops general readiness to detect and prevent any actions that could threaten the safety and security of society.

Another task of the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service is to train and offer expert assistance to other authorities and parties in questions related to violent radicalisation and extremism, together with the rest of the police. The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service is a member of the National Cooperation Network on preventing violent

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18  Preventive work done by the police is governed by the Strategy for Preventive Police Work 2019–2023, which was confirmed in December 2018.

19  The prevention of violent radicalisation was added to the agenda of the Anchor teams in the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 2016. Instructions for preventive work by the Anchor teams are provided in the Anchor Manual, Ministry of the Interior Publications 2019:16.

radicalisation and extremism, which was set up by the Ministry of the Interior, and contributes to creating an overview of violent extremism.

**Healthcare and social welfare services.** The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare and the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities participate in the implementation of the National Action Plan and the operations of the National Cooperation Network. Nationally, it is important to strengthen cooperation between different authorities and the third sector, develop research-based working methods and promote the competence of healthcare and social welfare services as well as other professionals. The Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare plans and provides training and tools that strengthen the competence of professionals in the fields as well as research supporting these in accordance with national objectives. A cross-sectional approach and multi-professional cooperation in the National Action Plan are also the cornerstones of social and health care services. The operations are governed by legislation concerning social and health care.

According to a survey conducted at the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare, social welfare professionals are most likely to encounter a child who arouses concern in child and family services, adult social work and immigrant services. Professionals in primary health care are most likely to encounter a patient who arouses concern in health centre work, especially in psychiatric and substance abuse services. In specialised medical care, the most likely place to encounter such a patient is in adult psychiatry and youth psychiatric services.

Knowledge of the tools for identification and prevention is vital, as is a clear understanding of the necessary services that a radicalised customer can be referred to if the medical professional's own skills and/or cooperation with other actors in the area are not sufficient. Some of the local social and health care professionals work in multi-professional Anchor teams.

Municipalities and joint municipal authorities as well as other employers of social and health care professionals are responsible for the sufficiency of the required resources as well as for developing the knowledge and skills of professionals. Organising cooperation in a networked manner with non-governmental organisations, for instance, is important as some radicalised individuals do not trust or want to deal with the authorities.  Restoring confidence can take time and calls for cooperation between different actors.

Social welfare services
It is possible to identify signs suggesting radicalisation in social welfare services and refer individuals arousing concern to the services they need, most importantly to services related to family support, livelihood, housing, education and employment. Correctly

targeted and timed support measures lead to better integration with the surrounding community and can interrupt the process of radicalisation. Child welfare measures may be needed when a person radicalised or in danger of being radicalised is under 18 years of age or has children who are still minors, and the non-institutional services offered to the family are not sufficient to secure the wellbeing of the child, young person or their family.

Health care
Radicalisation is not a health problem, so health care measures cannot be applied to it. However, preventive health care, for example, can promote the healthy development of children and young people and prevent or relieve behavioural and emotional disturbances. In addition, good treatment of mental disorders can affect broader developments that precede radicalisation. The purpose of health care services is to promote the health, wellbeing, operating capacity and social security of the population, i.e. their possibilities for involvement and participation. Promoting the wellbeing, operating capacity and participation of a health care patient also enhances the wellbeing of their friends and relatives and other people. Where necessary, health care services will collaborate with other authorities and also consult non-governmental organisations, such as activities increasing social participation.

In the **education sector**, the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Finnish National Agency for Education participate in the implementation of the National Action Plan and the operation of the National Cooperation Network. It is nationally important to secure and promote cooperation between the various parties, develop research-based working methods as well as promote the competence of the personnel in the education sector and early childhood education. The Finnish National Agency for Education plans, develops and organises training that strengthens competence as well as other measures together with regional administrative authorities. The education sector is involved in Anchor work.

The education sector and early childhood education support the integration of children and young people in society and can thus also strengthen factors that protect them from violent extremist radicalisation. Educational institutions are important partners in Anchor work and close cooperation is pursued with them. Teachers and school personnel reach the majority of young people and have the possibility to identify those in need of support and also the challenges concerning student welfare in general.

In the education sector, goals, content and methods related to comprehensive prevention are based on national and international laws, plans and documents guiding education, including early childhood education plans and curricula, the criteria for degrees, the UN Declaration of Children's Rights, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the Act on Equality as well as the Non-Discrimination Act. Their effectiveness is enhanced through basic and supplementary education for actors in the education sector as well as by developing the

operating and discussion culture in educational institutions.  The education sector also plays an important role in preventing topical social phenomena, such as racism and hate speech.

**Cultural services** have many important tasks in view of preventing violent radicalisation and extremism. Culture offers viewpoints and solutions that strengthen European values, democracy and togetherness. Education and culture provide a basis for active citizenship. Of the cultural actors, libraries as well as museums can promote debate and interaction between cultures and groups through exhibitions and events. Inclusive activities have increased in museums, through which different groups can be brought together in a safe environment, thus increasing understanding of different cultures and offering information instead of propaganda and hate speech. Arts and cultural services and related leisure-time activities promote the integration of immigrants and help people interact and do things together, which is necessary for their integration. These services are an effective way of introducing immigrants to Finnish culture. In addition, the availability of literature in languages understood by immigrants is ensured through cultural policy means. Cultural activities can also mitigate the factors leading to the social exclusion of children and young people, such as the lack of friends and pastimes, and increase their trust in their personal capabilities.

The **Ministry for Foreign Affairs** is responsible for Finland's foreign and security policy. In this role, it contributes to dealing with questions related to violent radicalisation and extremism as part of counter-terrorism measures in international cooperation. The key venues for international cooperation are the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Important in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is respect for human rights and international treaties. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for Finland's international human rights policy. Religious leaders and dialogue between religions also play an important role in preventing violent radicalisation and extremism, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs promotes such dialogue as part of efforts towards strengthening peace. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs participates in the work of the National Cooperation Network.

Young people from different backgrounds are encountered in **youth work**. Violent radicalisation and extremism pose a major threat to young people's wellbeing and future, and violently radicalised young people have a negative effect on the wellbeing and safety and security of other young people around them. In youth work, it may be possible to detect at an early stage young people who show an interest in violent extremist actions and extremist movements. It also allows identifying changes taking place in young people and intervening in such development through positive means and supporting them. Young people who are becoming absorbed by violent extremist ideas and engaged in the activities of extremist movements can also be encountered in outreach work. Municipal

youth services are involved in Anchor work in some areas.  It is possible to carry out measures in youth work that strengthen young people's involvement in society, media literacy and the ability to counter violence-inducing propaganda and recruitment to extremist movements.

In **prison administration**, it is possible to identify prisoners who are radicalising their inmates and to support prisoners and those serving a community sanction who have become or are becoming subject to the influence of violent extremism. The risks faced by releasing prisoners due to the threat of violent extremism or terrorism can be reduced through actions taken by the prison administration during imprisonment.

The **Finnish Defence Forces** receives tens of thousands of young men of enlisting age as well as hundreds of women and reservists every year. In this sense, the Finnish Defence Forces has the possibility to detect possible signs of violent radicalisation as well as provide information on violent extremist activities and the threat to society and individuals. The Finnish Defence Forces is an important actor in local cooperation to prevent violent radicalisation.

**Reception centres** deal with people who face an uncertain future. These people often come from areas where there is a lot of violence and hate speech. They follow the situation and events in those areas, and these may have an effect on their health, behaviour and reactions. Reception centres offer statutory reception services to asylum seekers as well as other reception services in an equal, professional manner, seeking to support and sustain the asylum seekers' ability to cope in a challenging situation in life and thus possibly avoiding the creation of extreme reactions.  Services and activities for asylum seekers are also arranged outside of reception centres by private, public and organisational actors. Reception centres refer asylum seekers to outside services and coordinate everything offered by the services and activities. Guiding reception centre customers towards positive participation in society reduces the risk of violent radicalisation. Through their observations, reception centre customers can help the personnel identify individuals who are at risk of being radicalised. The Finnish Immigration Service (Migri) is responsible for guiding, planning and monitoring practical operations in reception centres. The representative of the Finnish Immigration Service is a member of the National Cooperation Network.

**Non-governmental organisations** provide services and activities that play a key role in the prevention of violent extremism. People attracted to extremism and having joined extremist groups do not usually trust the authorities, so it is easier for them to use services provided by non-governmental organisations. These provide services that help people disengage from violence, mentoring and other care services that promote breaking free from ideologies that promote violence. They offer channels for influencing society without

violence and strengthen people's sense of equality and participation. It is easier for non-governmental organisations than the authorities to contact groups that are difficult to reach and support their participation in society.

## 5.3  Tasks of other parties of relevance to prevention

**Politicians and decision-makers** have the power to decide how and in which direction Finnish society will develop. They play an important role in defining values that guide the direction of development. Policy sectors important for the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation include education, social, health, employment, integration and housing policy. Successful policy measures in these fields reduce the breeding ground for violent radicalisation and extremism. Politicians and decision-makers influence public opinion and attitudes about violent extremism through their own example. Politicians can, through their actions, comments and example, reduce or increase hate speech, discrimination, social confrontation, equality and the implementation of other statutory rights as well as aspects that, in turn, either increase or reduce violent radicalisation in society. Politicians and decision-makers have power, they are opinion leaders and have considerable responsibility for preventing violent radicalisation and extremism.

**Religious communities** are experts and credible actors in matters related to the interpretation of religion. They can support individuals and groups who counter recruitment to violent groups. Religious communities play an important role in strengthening the immunity of communities against messages that encourage violence. They can together act against violence and spread information showing that hate and violence cannot be justified through religion. Religious communities are the target of violent extremist groups. They are subjected to violence, threat of violence, malicious acts, hate speech and even the threat of terrorism. Religious communities can support community members and increase their own capabilities to combat the threats imposed on them by violent extremism by collaborating with the authorities and non-governmental organisations.

**Business sector.** Violent extremism affects companies in many ways. Companies may do things that promote violent radicalisation. A good example of this is the spreading of material related to violent extremism or offering space for arranging events that promote violent radicalisation and extremism. Companies can take the prevention of violent radicalisation into consideration in their operations and services. Customers today pay more attention to the responsible operations of companies, and responsibility in efforts to promote social order and safety and security and to prevent violent radicalisation can be a strength for companies as well as a factor enhancing their reputation. According to

international experiences, the increased activities of violent extremist groups affects the competitiveness of companies, especially in small locations. This can, for example, hamper the recruitment of skilled personnel from overseas. A location where violent extremist groups operate openly and visibly seldom appears as a safe and desirable place to live. This also affects business activities. The aim of violent extremist groups is to increase confrontation between different people and groups of people who have different views, which may also be seen inside companies.

**Family and friends** may be in a position to prevent radicalisation. Social networks play an important role in violent radicalisation. Violent radicalisation may also occur without the family noticing it as violent extremist groups often insist that the individual engaged in their activities cuts all ties with people outside the group, including family and friends. The aim is that the individual is both physically and mentally fully dependent on the violent group and has no social contacts outside of it. A family member can be lost to a violent extremist group. The radicalisation of a family member affects the wellbeing of the whole family and also increases the risk of their radicalisation. However, emotional ties are often strong and play an important role in preventing a person from joining a violent extremist group. Family and friends should be given extensive help, advice and support at an early stage so they can prevent a family member from joining a violent extremist group, and look after a family member who returns to the family after having been under the influence and involved in the activities of a violent extremist group. With support, it is possible to prevent the family from breaking their ties with society and its services.

# 6 Implementation, monitoring and reporting

The implementation of the Action Plan is coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior. Ministries and their branches of administration are obligated to implement the Action Plan, which is based on the Government resolution. The involvement of municipalities, non-governmental organisations and other parties in the implementation of measures decided in the Action Plan is based on principles of cooperation and joint objectives as well as, where necessary, separate agreements.

An implementation plan is prepared for the fulfilment and implementation of the objectives and measures decided in the Action Plan, describing how the entities and related measures set out in section 7 will be implemented, together with the implementation schedule and responsible parties. Each party engaged in the implementation prepares a preliminary plan for the measures in the implementation it participates in or the implementation of which it is responsible for. The plans and activities are combined and prioritised by the National Cooperation Network.

The implementation plan is confirmed in the Ministerial Working Group on Internal Security and Strengthening the Rule of Law.

The progress of the implementation is annually reported to the Ministerial Working Group, and it is revised and complemented in connection with the reporting, where necessary. Organisations participating in the implementation are responsible for preparing an implementation plan for their actions and producing the necessary information for reporting. The report is prepared by the National Cooperation Network.

Organisations participating in the implementation ensure that information on the Action Plan, its implementation and their implementation responsibilities is disseminated within the organisation and the administrative branch to all experts, supervisors and management of relevance to implementation.

# 7  Objectives and measures

The general objectives of prevention have been decided under the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism until 2023.  Achieving the objectives requires actions from all the parties engaged in the implementation of the Action Plan.

Objectives have been set and measures determined for achieving the overall goals for cross-border entities implemented by different actors. These were selected on account of their current relevance. Achieving the objectives of the entities set out in section 7.2 and implementing measures call for joint efforts from the various actors. **The actor indicated as the responsible party (party responsible for launching the operation in bold) is responsible for ensuring that key actors in the matter are engaged in implementing the measures.**

The objectives and measures set out in section 7.2 are based on the development needs observed in the assessment of the National Action Plan that was completed in 2016. In the assessment, situations where the responsibility for a person or matter transfers from one actor to another were identified as challenges. Although such transition phases and the related development need have been recognised, the focus on developing prevention is primarily on enhancing the operation of each actor, not on improving the joint process. Therefore, it is important to develop the work of these entities in which productive operations call for collaboration between different actors and securing the activities in transition phases.

The objectives and measures of the key implementation organisations are described in section 7.3 of the Action Plan. Prepared by the actors themselves, they are measures needed to help the organisations strengthen their operations in the context of preventing violent radicalisation and extremism. Developing the operations of the organisations is also important so they can better implement the objectives and measures set out in section 7.2 of the Action Plan.

It can be stated by way of conclusion that the objectives and measures of the Action Plan consist of three parts. The general objectives in section 7.1 describe the overall goals of the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism, and their achievement will be assessed in 2023. The objectives and measures of the entities in section 7.2 describe the key areas of operations in which the goals set must be achieved and **the implementation of which calls for joint efforts among the various actors**. Section 7.3 lists the objectives and measures the key actors participating in the implementation have set for the development of their operations and administrative branch in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. T**o some degree, the implementation** of these measures **calls for cooperation with other actors and the assessment of legislation**. The implementation of the measures set out in sections 7.2 and 7.3 are reported and revised on an annual basis.

## 7.1    General objectives of the Action Plan

The goal of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism is to:

1. Reduce extremist violence and the threat of it.
2. Promote the implementation of equality, freedom of speech and other constitutional rights.
3. Ensure that structures and procedures based on multi-professional cooperation and allowing the authorities, non-governmental organisations and communities to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism are available nationally, regionally and locally.
4. Detect and investigate efficiently hate crime, including punishable hate crime deemed to meet the criteria of a crime. Combat speech that violates human dignity and prohibited under the Non-Discrimination Act, as well as harassment prohibited under the Act on Equality. Support victims and identify the impacts of hate crime and illegal speech and harassment on the victim's reference group.
5. Decrease the impacts of violent extremist movements on local communities and environments.
6. People living in Finland, especially young people, consider influencing society and decision-making through legal means effective and meaningful. The view of the world and actions of violent extremist movements do not appear an attractive alternative.

7.    The knowledge of the authorities and non-governmental
      organisations for the prevention of violent extremism increases.

## 7.2    Objectives and measures of cross-sectoral entities

The objectives and measures of the cross-sectoral entities of different actors are presented below. The responsibility for launching the measures and shared effort as well as reporting results lies with the organisation indicated as the responsible party, which must ensure that relevant actors are involved in the operations.

### 7.2.1    Preventing violent extremism and radicalisation locally

Local prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is very important. Individuals and groups become radicalised and operate locally and are part of local social networks and communities. Violent extremist groups locally influence the safety and security and sense of security of people and communities. Violent extremist groups make efficient use of local incidents and create their own interpretations about them that support their ideology and goals and spread the interpretations especially through social media. This multiplies the consequences and effects of individual incidents locally, especially if the matter is not reacted to quickly and efficiently. Effective local prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism calls for cooperation between different authorities and with non-governmental organisations as well as including young people, women and religious communities in the operations, sustaining a knowledge-based overview, training different actors, introducing broad preventive measures as well as effective, correctly timed interventions and referring individuals who have been or are in danger of being radicalised to the necessary services.

The current state and development needs of local operations are described in the Ministry of the Interior's report 17/19 "Observations and Recommendations for Local Collaboration on Referral Mechanism of Persons of Concern in Local Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration for Preventing Violent Radicalisation". The report also includes a description of how local operations have been organised in some countries. Local operations have also been discussed in the assessment report of the National Action Plan 2016[20].

20   Assessment of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism of the Ministry of the Interior. Ministry of the Interior publications, 18/2019.

## Objectives

The aim is to locally prevent, together with the authorities and with non-governmental organisations the radicalisation of individuals and groups and their involvement in the activities of violent extremist movements. In addition, measures are taken to combat and prevent the impacts of violent extremist movements on people's living and residential environments as well as on their security and sense of security. The work takes account of the activities of extremist movements in social media[21], owing to which the authorities and non-governmental organisations increase their presence in social media. Ensuring that violently radicalised individuals or those in danger of radicalisation are referred to services provided by the authorities and other actors that assist them in rejecting violence[22]. Intervening with factors that promote violent radicalisation, such as confrontation, punishable hate speech, racism and discrimination. Increasing knowledge of the ways in which municipalities can reduce violent radicalisation and the impact of factors increasing extremism as part of the basic work done by their subdivisions. Utilising the information produced by and cooperation opportunities offered by universities and other research institutes in local work.

## Measures

1. *Promoting and disseminating information on Anchor work.* In multi-professional Anchor work, the police, social worker, psychiatric nurse, education officer and often the youth worker work with young people who have committed symptomatic crime, with the aim of breaking the cycle of crime and ending behaviour harmful to the child's or young person's future as early as possible. Anchor customers also include persons whose challenge is violent radicalisation[23]. The target group of Anchor work is children and young people under 18 years of age. There is no upper age limit in cases connected with violent radicalisation, and adult social work also participates in the operations in the case of customers aged 18 years or older.  Anchor work serves as a contact point that other authorities and actors as well as citizens can contact if they have concerns about violently radicalised individuals or families. Supporting Anchor work and its development through local means as described in the

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21  Some extremist movements still operate through traditional websites and blogs as well as channels such as ylilauta.org, or through P2P services in addition to social media platforms, including Facebook and Twitter.

22  The services refer to Anchor work and authorities' services that deal with factors underlying radicalisation.

23  The prevention of violent radicalisation was added to the work of the Anchor teams in the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 2016.

Anchor manual[24] . Disseminating information on Anchor work to different authorities, non-governmental organisations and religious communities. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior,** Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry of Education and Culture, National Police Board, the Finnish National Agency for Education, the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare.

2. *Ensuring referral to services from tip-off to support.* Introducing the operating model presented in the report "Observations about the case management interface and recommendations for the development of operations"[25] in all parts of the country through operations guidance, management, training and disseminating information. The operating model is described in Appendix 2 of the Action Plan. The aim of the model is to ensure that in a case of concern the person is referred to services, through collaboration between the authorities, that will help them reject violent radicalisation and extremism. Essential from the point of view of successful referral to services is smooth, permanent cooperation and the access of the receiving party to sufficient resources for producing the service. In addition to the existing services, Exit services customised for this target group should be developed. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health**, Ministry of Education and Culture, National Police Board, police departments, the Finnish National Agency for Education, the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare.

3. *Arranging training for the Anchor teams and other collaborating actors for promoting cooperation.* Arranging training that promotes competence, cooperation and exchange of information between different actors. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior** together with the national Anchor steering group, authorities responsible for the operations of local Anchor teams.

4. *Procedures for receiving feedback.* Procedures are introduced through which persons providing tips receive confirmation indicating that the tip has reached the recipient and has been taken into consideration, within the framework of legislation. It is important to inform the person providing the tip that the tip will be reacted to even if this does not take place in a visible manner. Gathering summary data about the operations and processing

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24  Anchor manual. Ministry of the Interior publications, 21/2019.

25  Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:17.

it together with the relevant parties to develop the operations. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, Ministry of Justice, National Police Board, police departments.

5. *Continuing the work of the existing cooperation networks and establishing local cooperation networks in locations* where they do not yet exist and that need such operations based on the local overview and threat assessment. Clarifying the objectives and tasks of the networks and revising their composition, where necessary, based on good experiences about the work done so far as well as international good practices. Developing the operations so that the role of cities and municipalities in the operations of the cooperation networks becomes more prominent in accordance with international good practices and that authorities and non-governmental organisations of relevance to preventing violent radicalisation as well as the representatives of other actors are engaged in the work. Strengthening regional cooperation when the threats and phenomena related to violent radicalisation cross municipal boundaries. Ensuring that information on the operations of the cooperation network and the services it produces, such as a common overview, training and other work promoting the prevention of violent radicalisation, is broadly disseminated to local actors and communities. Ensuring cooperation with Anchor work by introducing an expert engaged in the Anchor scheme as a member of the network. Responsible parties: **Parties responsible for the operations of local cooperation networks.**

An example of the tasks of the local cooperation network:

– Creating a regional overview based on information from all the participating actors, and updating and maintaining it regularly by the parties engaged in the cooperation network.

– Securing, through coordinated collaboration that the operations are at the level required by the overview, all relevant actors are engaged in the work and competence and expertise are developed and disseminated in the area. It is important that every actor recognises their responsibility, task and role in the work and understands how the work is related to their basic task.

– Annually determining concrete objectives and measures based on an overview in order to direct the operations according to the region's challenges and characteristics.

– Improving the flow of information and consistent communication about violent radicalisation and extremism.

- Creating a model/process on the basis of which the local actors can contact parties of relevance to the operations (referring to services) in case of concern about the radicalisation of a person or group.
- Improving the wellbeing, security and sense of security of the municipality's residents.

6. *Increasing dialogue and interaction.* Arranging local events in which different groups can enter into dialogue with each other. Promoting interaction increases knowledge and understanding between groups, which is crucial to preventing the expansion of confrontation, polarisation and the breeding ground for violent extremism. The events can also take a broadly visible form, such as peace walks with representatives from different religions. Responsible parties: **Local authorities and non-governmental organisations together** with local cooperation networks.

7. *Supporting the extension of the Show Racism the Red Card project in football and other team sports* as well as the visibility of the project in sports events. Continuing to support projects that promote equality in sports. Responsible parties: **Ministry of Education and Culture**, non-governmental organisations.

8. *Arranging sports events* with the aim of building trust and promoting dialogue between communities in case of controversy. Strengthening dialogue between local communities and preventing controversy through the Peace United football and peace building concept. Peace United supports local conflict resolution and acts as a trust building tool in Finland and globally. Responsible parties: **Finn Church Aid and the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers together** with the National Cooperation Network and local cooperation groups.

9. *Promoting the competence of persons with a key role in the operations to identify polarisation and dismantle polarisation development.* The aim is to increase knowledge of polarisation and its dynamics and introduce experts specialised in polarisation who are capable of acting and supporting other actors in a situation where confrontation is aggravated and the activities of violent extremist groups and their hate speech increases. Responsible parties: **Local cooperation groups** and non-governmental organisations involved in them.

10. *Improving the ability of the authorities to identify violent radicalisation and assess the related threat.* Developing a risk assessment model for use by and supporting cooperation between

municipalities and other authorities, making use of the risk
assessment method developed by the Danish Centre for Prevention
of Extremism[26]. The purpose of the model is to assess the risk of
violent radicalisation at an early stage, taking into consideration the
individual's strengths and risk factors. It is thus well suited for use by
municipal employees, for example. Responsible parties: **Ministry of
Social Affairs and Health**, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare.

11. *Strengthening the resilience of children and young people.*
    Supporting the deployment of Teaching Controversial Issues and
    Dembra materials of the Council of Europe (the Finnish National
    Agency for Education supports the deployment of the above
    two programmes) and linking them with the Free to speak –
    Safe to Learn campaign of the Council of Europe as well as the
    dissemination of the *Minun Silmin, Sinun Silmin* (MiSi; I See You See)
    programme. Responsible parties: **The Finnish National Agency for
    Education**, local cooperation networks and groups.

12. *Strengthening the participation of the business sector and
    companies in local efforts to prevent violent radicalisation.* Among
    others, companies can contribute to the implementation of
    campaigns that prevent violent radicalisation at an early stage by
    combatting hate speech and instigation to violence and promote
    positive interaction, dialogue and understanding between different
    population groups. Responsible parties: **local cooperation
    networks and groups** together with local companies.

## 7.2.2 Strengthening the participation of young people in the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation

Violent radicalisation and extremism as well as the activities of extremist movements
are seen in young people's everyday lives in many ways. They can also take the form of
racism and discrimination, hate speech especially in social media, and as threats, insults
and exclusion. The social atmosphere and polarisation can be seen in young people's
behaviour as confrontation and aggravated interaction characterised by black-and-
white opinions in classrooms and other situations where young people get together.
Acts of violence related to terrorism and violent extremism arouse fear in children and
young people, impairing their wellbeing and sense of security. The impacts of violent
radicalisation and extremism in the lives of children and young people are especially

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26   Permission has been requested and received from the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism for using the
assessment method.

problematic when they do not have the chance to process the matters in a safe environment before the situations become aggravated. It should be noted, however, that not all children and young people come across the phenomenon in the same way. Its impacts vary according to locality, city district and school, and may differ according to the backgrounds of the children and young people in question.

It is difficult for young people to outline and understand discussion about violent radicalisation, extremism and extremist movements and how it relates to other phenomena, such as confrontation, polarisation, hate speech and racism. It may also be challenging to identify the relationship of cause and effect, especially if the matter is not discussed under the safe guidance of adults.

The capabilities, willingness and skills of people working with children and young people to process difficult, controversial topics is essential in view of the impacts of violent radicalisation, extremism and other related phenomena[27].

There are also families in Finland in which children are brought up to accept violence and violations of human rights in accordance with the ideology of extremist movements. In addition, there are families where the parents' racist, discriminatory opinions are passed on to the next generation. Young people are subjected to propaganda and recruitment by violent extremist groups. Adolescence is a stage in life when individuals are open to new influences and are looking for direction and meaning in their lives. At this point, they can also be a fruitful target for influence that can prove very negative, even dangerous to their future.

Young people are a major resource in preventing violent radicalisation and extremism as well as building peace and reducing confrontation. They can support other young people and make use of their experiences and expertise in preventive work.

The participation of young people in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism has been outlined in the UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (2016) and the goals of the UN Resolution 2250.

## Objectives

The goal is for young people to be involved in the planning and implementation of measures to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism. The opportunities

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27  Questions related to education, for instance, are discussed in the Ministry of the Interior publication *Sanat ovat Tekoja,* 17 May 2019. Enhancing actions against hate speech and online bullying.

and capabilities of young people to participate in the operations are increased by strengthening their competence and possibilities to influence in everyday questions of peace and security. Their involvement is based on their own actions, supported by the authorities and other adults, where necessary.

## Measures

1. *Creating safe venues for discussion.* Young people want and must be given opportunities to talk with adults about violent radicalisation and extremism and the related phenomena. Adults make sure that venues and opportunities for such dialogue are available to young people. Any subject can be talked about, and it is for the adults to keep the discussions safe and lead them in the right direction on the basis of democracy and respect for human rights. Responsible parties: **Professionals working with young people** (e.g. the education sector and youth work).

2. *Promoting the use of plain language when talking about phenomena.* The ability of adults to use concepts related to violent radicalisation and extremism correctly and to specify the phenomenon is increased through training and support material. Responsible parties: Professionals working with and meeting young people, **Expert network on extremist ideas and resilience coordinated by the Faculty of Educational Sciences, the University of Helsinki.**

3. *Involving young people in planning and implementing measures to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism.* Making sure that young people can contribute to planning and implementing measures to combat violent radicalisation and extremism nationally, regionally and locally. It is for the authorities to invite young people to contribute to these efforts. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, Ministry of Education and Culture, the Finnish National Agency for Education, local cooperation groups.

4. *Strengthening young people's competence and possibilities of influence in everyday questions of peace and security* by organising the Reach Out peace academy, which brings together young people from different backgrounds who are interested in peace work and social influence. The Reach Out peace academy offers young people tools to operate at the local level, in their daily lives and in collaboration with other actors to prevent violent radicalisation, extremism and conflicts. Responsible parties: **Finn Church Aid and the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers**

together with the National Cooperation Network. Use is made of the expertise of the Changemaker network and local networks in organising the Academy.

5. *Clarifying the content and objectives of democracy education.* Democracy education is included in the foundations of the curriculum, though its content should be developed so that young people can understand democracy and its principles more easily. The measure can be implemented as part of the preparation of the democracy programme across branches of administration, as decided in the 2019 Government programme. Responsible parties: **Ministry of Education and Culture**, the Finnish National Agency for Education.

6. *Making sure that young people receive help with mental health problems.* In some cases, violent radicalisation has to do with mental health disorders. However, the question is not of a specific illness, nor does any illness cause radicalisation. It is important to improve the availability of mental health services for young people so that they can receive help with mental health problems quickly and at the right time before the illness can contribute to the development of radicalisation. Being influenced by violent extremist ideas and engaged in such activities can aggravate problems related to the mental health of young people. Responsible parties: **Social and health services,** Anchor teams.

7. *Arranging round table discussions between young people and the authorities.* Young people may often consider the authorities distant and their impression about the police, for instance, can be based on their friends' opinions or stories posted in social media. Arranging regular discussions with young people and increasing their knowledge about the operations of the authorities and the reasons for such operations. Responsible parties: Various authorities, **local cooperation groups.**

8. *Promoting low-threshold sports activities open to everyone.* Sports and physical exercise are an effective way of bringing together young people who do not usually do things together and thus reduce tension, hostility and prejudice between different groups. Creating opportunities for low-threshold sports activities open to everyone so that young people can meet each other. The aim is to introduce activities that reduce prejudice towards young people representing different groups and also offer opportunities to talk about difficult themes. In addition, developing non-discrimination and equality work in sports and supporting anti-racism activities

(Show Racism the Red Card). Responsible parties: **Ministry of Education and Culture**, local cooperation groups, youth work, sports clubs, non-governmental organisations and volunteers working with young people.

9. *Improving the ability of the authorities interacting with and encountering young people through the internet as well as that of volunteers to prevent violent radicalisation.* Young people interested in violent extremist movements and their activities are encountered in youth and police work on the internet. Improving the awareness and ability of the actors to identify violent extremist movements and their activities. Improving the competence of authorities and volunteers encountering young people to enter into discussions with young people in which the ideology of violent extremist movements is questioned on the basis of facts. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, the Ministry of Education and Culture, National Police Board, Save the Children.

### 7.2.3 Identifying and combatting recruitment into the activities of violent extremist groups

Violent extremist groups recruit and enroll supporters as well as new members and actors over the internet, at events arranged outside of the internet as well as through social networks. Recruitment takes place in social media or through discussions taking place in connection with online games, for examples. According to research, only a few people become radicalised solely as a result of propaganda spreading over the internet, though some cases are known where this has happened. However, the large-scale consumption of terrorist propaganda may lower the threshold for committing a violent attack[28]. Social networks play an important role in joining the activities of violent extremist groups. Many of the individuals who travelled from Finland to the conflict areas in Syria and Iraq after 2012 have had friends or relatives who have also travelled there. It is estimated that in Finland the importance of social networks in making the travel decision is especially prominent[29].

Recruitment into the activities of violent extremist groups can take place in and around premises where persons belonging to the target group are present. Premises intended for sports and youth work as well as the surroundings of schools are examples of places where recruitment attempts have been observed. It can be stated on the basis of the available information that recruitment seldom takes place on the premises of religious

28  For example, see the Turku stabbings 18 August 2018. Report by the Safety Investigation Authority, P2017-01. Chapter 2.2.1.

29  Jihadism in Finland. Malkki & Saarinen. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:14.

groups. However, such actions have been observed in their surroundings as well as in private apartments.

Emotions play an important role in violent radicalisation. Different violent extremist groups use similar methods to recruit new supporters and members. Manipulation is an essential part of recruitment, and so are conspiracy theories and narratives (stories) presented to justify the activities and the use of violence. The aim is to affect people's emotions and the desire to be accepted, to be part of something bigger and a member of a group. Strengthening experiences of injustice is another important way of attracting supporters of violent ideologies and activities.

A fairly heterogeneous group of people participate in far-right and anti-immigration activities. Middle-aged and older persons are strongly represented, especially in the street protest groups that originated in the autumn 2015. The Nordic Resistance Movement[30] and Soldiers of Odin also appeal to younger people. Social media has been the key channel for spreading their activities. The groups give out information about their presence and activities on the internet and seek to attract new members through social networking services. The activities are coordinated over the internet. Journalistically edited media can promote recruitment to far-right activities by disseminating information about their activities in connection with news and mainstreaming the propaganda of violent extremist groups by introducing concepts they are using. The activities of the groups have been visible in journalistically edited media especially since 2015. The groups, especially those continuing the activities of the Nordic Resistance Movement, disseminate materials in public spaces. Its representatives have also networked internationally into operating environments made up by music sub-cultures, for example. Finnish White Power bands perform in different parts of the world, including the United States and Europe. Similar return visits have also been made at least in Europe. Social networks and personal relations also play a role in joining violent far-right activities.

There has been fairly little violent non-parliamentary far left and anarchistic activity in Finland in the last few years, and no research-based information is available on how people join the activities of these groups. According to existing research, it seems that global events as well as political and social development play a role in how attractive direct action is considered. Investigations have shown that the financial crisis of 2008 and its consequences as well as the increased visibility of the Nordic Resistance Movement have contributed to the activeness of the activities in Finland[31].

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30  The case of prohibiting the activities of the Nordic Resistance Movement is currently being processed in the Supreme Court.

31  *Suoraa toimintaa!* Monti & Purokuru 2018.

## Objectives

The aim is to ensure that professionals have enough up-to-date information so they can identify the emblems, symbols, propaganda and recruitment methods of violent extremist movements. Identifying the connection of hate speech to violent radicalisation and extremism. Identifying situations and channels in which recruitment takes place and intervening in the activities. Supporting the individual subject to recruitment with the aim of preventing them from becoming influenced by violent extremist activities. Strengthening the capabilities of people working with adults to identify individuals and families affected by violent extremism and enhancing their ability to offer services that help individuals reject violent ideology.

## Measures

1. *Increasing professionals' knowledge concerning the emblems and symbols of violent extremist groups.* Increasing knowledge by preparing inserts, through training and providing videos and other support material, for instance. The aim is that professionals have sufficient information so they can identify emblems and symbols and discuss with young people especially the types of activities dangerous to safety and security, wellbeing and social order they are related to. Responsible parties: Ministry of Education and Culture, **the Finnish National Agency for Education**, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare, the police.

2. *Identifying and removing recruitment material, such as labels and other materials.* Increasing the knowledge of cities, municipalities, resident associations, sports clubs, teachers and other people working with young people about the material disseminated by violent extremist movements and removing it from the surroundings of schools, for instance. Responsible parties: **Local cooperation groups** together with civil society, people responsible for premises where recruitment takes place.

3. *Ensuring that premises maintained through public financing are not used for activities whose aim is to promote confrontation between different population groups and instigate people to hate and violence.* Agreeing on procedures through which parties renting out municipal premises have enough up-to-date information on groups engaged in violent activities so that publicly funded premises are not used for activities that endanger the rights established in the Constitution. The authorities have the statutory obligation to promote equality, and the activities of violent extremist groups

    are opposed to equality. Responsible parties: **Local cooperation groups**, authorities responsible for renting out facilities.

4. *Increasing information about the methods and practices used in recruitment.* Increasing the knowledge of people working with young people as well as other professionals meeting individuals at risk of radicalisation about the methods used in inducing people to engage in violent extremism (such as grooming for extremism and terrorism). Enhancing the capabilities of professionals to intervene in a situation and support the person subject to grooming. Responsible parties: **Professionals meeting young people and adults.**

5. Developing a recruitment monitoring and analysis method together with the authorities and researchers. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, researchers.

### 7.2.4  Combatting terrorist propaganda and punishable hate speech

The channels for disseminating terrorist propaganda are more powerful than before, the amount of propaganda has increased and its quality has improved. The terrorist organisation ISIL in particular has become known for its versatile media strategy that makes use of novel digital media tools through which it has targeted its message according to the needs of different audiences and maximised people's awareness of its "brand". Especially the production and use of shocking and violent videos has been part of ISIL's communications for a long time[32]. This has led to counter-measures. Social media platforms have begun to remove terrorist propaganda and hate speech more effectively, the authorities have intensified their operations and the EU has also launched an initiative intended to remove terrorist propaganda[33] and that is currently being processed by the European Parliament.

Social media always comes up as a channel for disseminating terrorist propaganda and hate speech. However, such messages can also be disseminated through journalistically edited media and traditional websites. This gives people committing terrorist attacks and extremist groups the attention they are after, which always also offers the possibility to disseminate propaganda. The target group of journalistically edited media is much broader than just those interested in the activities of violent extremist groups. It thus forms a channel for disseminating messages to a broad audience. The word choices

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32  Jihadist online communication and Finland. Malkki & Saarinen. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:15.
33  July 2019.

used in journalistically edited media play an important role. For example, the ISIL propaganda agency Amaq has claimed to be a news agency in the same way as Reuters, which made its messages appear convincing and obscured the propagandistic nature of the information disseminated through it. The Muslim population especially is highly dissatisfied with journalistically edited media, which is often seen as strengthening negative stereotypes about Muslims through its story and image choices.

Hate speech is linked with violent radicalisation and in spreading the activities of extremist groups. Hate speech increases insecurity and reduces the sense of security, increases the feeling of being an outsider and divides people into "us" and "them" – friends and enemies – thus strengthening confrontation. Hate speech creates a breeding ground for and promotion of the factors underlying violent radicalisation. Combatting hate speech is challenging. It is spread over the internet and social media services produced by companies in different countries. Countries differ in terms of how hate speech is treated in their legislation, and there is no single international definition of hate speech. In public debate, drawing a line between speech acceptable under freedom of speech and speech fulfilling the criteria of crime is often considered difficult. One reason for this is that extremist actors and groups actively work against combatting hate speech, which for them is an important way of increasing confrontation between different groups and mistrust towards the authorities and institutions. Combatting hate speech is also largely affected by the importance that politicians and decision-makers attach to combatting hate speech and how much resources the authorities have for combatting it.

Terrorist propaganda and hate speech make extensive use of repeated narratives[34] by way of justifying a threat, their own activities and the violence related to them. These narratives spread globally. The narratives of violent non-parliamentary far right and religiously motivated extremism share a lot in common and make similar use of people's emotions, fears and uncertainties. To make the narratives appear convincing, they are essentially devised to create a shadow of suspicion in the recipient's mind. They cannot be completely invalidated, however, as there may be a single case confirming the story or narrative is at least partly true. Hate speech advances gradually. First, suspicion is aroused, which is then maintained and spread and followed by exhaustive hate speech that centres around insults, showing disdain towards and disparaging its target or target group[35].

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34 A narrative means a narration or story that can be written or verbal. The original Finnish version of this Action Plan uses the word "narratiivi", even though it is not actually good Finnish. Using Finnish equivalents of the term can be misleading, as the term "narratiivi" is broadly used in Finnish in this context.

35 Professor Jaana Hallamaa 12 February 2019.

Examples of the narratives used by the violent non-parliamentary far right include [36] "Our national identity is under threat", which often also involves the population exchange conspiracy theory. According to the theory, the national identity and white race are being threatened by immigration. The narrative points out, among other things, that there are more people from other ethnic backgrounds in residential areas and schools than before and so the white race will gradually become a minority. The actual number of immigrants does not play a role in the narrative, as indicated by the fact that the person committing the terrorist attack in New Zealand[37] used the narrative as a justification for his attack even though the Muslim population in New Zealand is very small. In the narrative "We do not live in the way we should", the idea is to strengthen the "natural" roles and tasks of men and women. Men should be strong heads of the family, while women should foster their natural roles as mothers and giving birth to children. According to the narrative, the trends or parties guilty of the situation, which even causes a low birth rate among the white race, are multiculturality, feminism and the representatives of sexual minorities. A third key far-right narrative is based on the idea that immigrants are favoured at the cost of the majority population. It suggests that immigrants receive better benefits from society and are prioritised over the country's "own population", blaming the government and municipal administration for this.

In religiously motivated violent extremism, the "Islam is under attack" narrative is crucial when the intention is to recruit the Muslim population living in Western countries. In activities outside of Western countries, local unfairness causing feelings of bitterness and injustice are referred to. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are considered examples of how Western countries try to conquer and suppress Muslim countries (Christian Western countries led by the United States, i.e. "the Crusade narrative"). This narrative also involves the dual standards theme, according to which Western countries talk about human rights, for example, but, at the same time, violate these by allowing torture and letting thousands of innocent Muslim civilians die in different parts of the world. Another important narrative is "Muslims can never succeed and live as accepted citizens in Western countries". This is used to account for the misfortunes experienced by individuals, such as difficulties in finding a job. The narrative is also closely linked with the often heated debate about how Muslim women dress and scarf bans. It is difficult to challenge this narrative because, according to several investigations of Islamophobia, the Muslim population is subject to increased discrimination and threat of violence in Europe. ISIL cleverly uses this narrative in its propaganda, and the propaganda and hate speech spread by the far right support the key message of the narrative. The third narrative is connected with the ISIL caliphate and its collapse. The message of the narrative is "The war is not over". This is used to

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36   The stories of both far-right and religiously motivated extremism are based on discussions and materials published in the RAN network.

37   Terrorist attack against two mosques in Christchurch 15 March 2019.

encourage followers to participate in combat in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Philippines or attack infidels in Western countries. The key message of the narrative is that god puts true believers to the test and the collapse of the caliphate was just a temporary setback.

Opinions against hierarchy and leaders are emphasised in violent non-parliamentary far left ideology and narratives. Anti-fascists use narratives in order to limit the spread of fascist and far-right ideology and oppose all parties sympathising with the far right. The violent far left considers the global capitalist economic system the cause for social polarisation, inequality and environmental problems. Opposing capitalism is thus also linked with radical environmental activities.

The motives of acts committed by individuals acting alone can be related to different narratives and conspiracy theories. They often justify their actions with a manifesto or some other summary of their thoughts and motives for the acts. These are disseminated through different forums. The person who carried out the Mosque attack in New Zealand, for example, published a 74-page manifesto that was shared through Twitter and 8chan, for instance. The heading of the manifesto referred to the conspiracy theory about population exchange and included hate speech and symbols related to neo-Nazism.

## Objectives

Increasing the knowledge and understanding of the general public and professionals about communications related to violent extremism and hate speech. Broadly increasing knowledge about the key concepts and narratives used in communications and hate speech. Strengthening the ability of people working with young people to talk about propaganda and hate speech.

Identifying and intervening with hate speech and supporting the victim of hate speech. Strengthening equality by intervening with all terrorist propaganda and hate speech in the same way regardless of their author. Increasing topic-related research, which produces more information on the types of material disseminated over the internet, how people react to, consume and understand it as well as how the material is treated in journalistically produced media.

## Measures

1. *Strengthening the media literacy of adults.* The media literacy of children and young people has been strengthened in the last few years, whereas fairly little has been done to improve that of adults. However, according to the police, hate speech is most commonly disseminated by men aged 30 years or over, and there are also

women in this group. Increasing the knowledge of adults about freedom of speech and its boundaries. Adults also play an important role in view of children's media literacy, as the attitudes of parents to hate speech and racism are often passed on to the next generation. Responsible parties: Ministry of Education and Culture, the Finnish National Agency for Education, **National Audiovisual Institute KAVI.**

2. *Increasing knowledge and the ability to identify* the concepts and narratives used by extremist groups. Preparing training material and related support material for different occupational groups and the general public. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior,** Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Justice, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare.

3. *Increasing research-based information* on narratives and the types of material disseminated over the internet, how people react to, consume and understand it as well as how the material is treated in journalistically produced media. Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, **researchers**.

4. *Increasing information about the types of material that young people encounter on the internet.* The key questions are the type of the material and how young people have reacted to it. The material to be collected covers the far right and far left as well as religiously motivated extremism. Investigating whether collecting such data can be permanently connected with an existing interview survey or a corresponding survey. Responsible parties: **Ministry of Education and Culture**, Ministry of Justice, the Finnish National Agency for Education, the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare.

5. *Increasing cooperation between the authorities and companies,* with the aim of expanding the knowledge of the authorities, parents and companies of the way in which terrorist organisations and extremist actors utilise computer games and mobile applications in communications and networking. War games also make it possible to practise armed action in a virtual world. Gaming platforms can be used for recruitment and operative communications. Different types of dating applications are also used for this purpose. Developing counter-measures to combat the above activities. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, National Police Board, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, companies.

6. *Strengthening the ability and possibility of the authorities to combat and remove terrorist propaganda and punishable hate speech efficiently from the internet* by making effective use of the

opportunities of the current legislation, strengthening the operations of the national VIPU group of the Helsinki Police Department and the National Bureau of Investigation as well as police activity taking place in social media. Utilising the opportunities offered by Chapter 17(17) of the Criminal Code of Finland (Distribution of depictions of violence[38]) in removing violent material disseminated over the internet. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, National Police Board, National Bureau of Investigation, police departments.

7.  *Taking account of promoting dialogue between cultures and preventing hate speech* in grants allocated by the Arts Promotion Centre Finland to promoting cultural diversity and combatting racism. Placing emphasis on the grants to actors who in their activities promote dialogue and interaction between different cultures as well as the prevention of hate speech.  Responsible parties: **Ministry of Education and Culture**, Arts Promotion Centre Finland.

8.  *Participating in international cooperation* to remove terrorist propaganda and punishable hate speech from the internet. Taking the necessary steps related to the initiative of the European Commission to remove terrorist propaganda from the internet, provided that the initiative is approved. Securing the necessary resources. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, Ministry of Justice, National Police Board, National Bureau of Investigation.

9.  *Implementing the sections of the Government Programme of Prime Minister Rinne* according to which intersectoral measures will be implemented to intervene even more strongly in systematic harassment, threatening and online shaming that threaten freedom of speech, the operations of authorities, investigation and communications. Taking into consideration measures against hate speech in the preparation of the Government's action plan against racism and discrimination. Responsible parties: **Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Education and Culture**, together with other authorities and non-governmental organisations.

10.  *Taking intensified action against hate speech and online bullying.* Several intensified actions against hate speech and online bullying

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38  Criminal Code of Finland, section 17: A person who offers for sale or for rent, distributes or otherwise offers or keeps available or for this purpose manufactures or imports films or other audiovisual programmes or recordings or data files containing such films or audiovisual programmes depicting brutal violence shall be sentenced for the distribution of depictions of violence to a fine or to imprisonment for at most two years.

are presented in the Ministry of the Interior publication 2019:23, prepared by a broad expert group in spring 2019. The responsible ministries decide together the actions that will be implemented. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and Culture.

### 7.2.5 Promoting the safety and security of religious communities and their participation in efforts to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism

Violent extremism affects religious communities in many ways. Religious communities are the target of the threat imposed by violent extremist groups. Religious communities and their members are subject to violence, threatening with violence and hate speech. According to research, Muslim women identified according to their clothing are more often subject to violence and threats in public places than men, and violence against them has increased.

Security threats are imposed on the premises of religious communities and the people gathering there, and preparing for such threats calls for more resources and competence. This type of threat has increased and become more serious in recent times, as indicated by the attacks committed against mosques and Muslim places of prayer. Threats against Jewish communities have continued to increase with the rise of anti-Semitism. The threat against religious communities has also increased in Finland and they have been subjected to more vandalism recently.

Religious communities suffer from the activities of violent extremist groups in many ways, and it is important that they have the opportunity to actively contribute to improving the security of their own communities and the society as a whole. Violent radicalisation takes place locally, and religious communities are part of local communities, reaching a large number of people. They can participate in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism in many ways. They have the competence and skills that are important for prevention, such as knowledge of languages and cultures, family services, the possibility to provide psycho-social support and religious literacy. Religious communities can help find solutions to local conflicts that, when aggravated, could increase confrontation between population groups as well as violent radicalisation.

Islamophobia has increased in Europe, including Finland, in addition to anti-Semitism. Islamophobia means hostility, prejudice and discrimination towards Muslims. It is often used as a means for spreading anti-Semitism.

Religious communities encounter people in different situations and stages in life and can provide doctrinal guidance and mental support and thus strengthen people's resilience against violent extremism and instigation to hate. Religious communities, together with authorities and non-governmental organisations, can refer individuals in danger of radicalisation to services that help them reject extremist ideology and violence.

## Objectives

Increasing the crisis preparedness of religious communities, the security of their places of worship as well as the safety and sense of security of their members by enhancing the investigation of hate crimes, including hate speech that fulfills the criteria of a crime.

Strengthening the ability and opportunities of religious communities to participate in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism by increasing cooperation and competence in the prevention of violent extremism and in efforts to prevent the impacts of polarisation and hate speech. Increasing confidence and cooperation between the authorities, religious communities, especially their female members, and non-governmental organisations. The aim is to ensure that information on the prevention of violent extremism, the existing services and opportunities to receive support reaches the individuals and families who are in a vulnerable position or need support.

Increasing the religion literacy skills of authorities working with religious communities and their knowledge of the role of the communities as a local partner and bridge builder.

## Measures

1. *Investigating threats imposed on the premises of religious communities and organising training* to improve their preparedness for security threats and crises. Preparing a premises safety manual for use by religious communities. Utilising international examples in the training. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, National Police Board, police departments.
2. *Investigating how procedures for funding security measures for religious communities (excluding the Evangelic-Lutheran Church in Finland[39])* should be reformed in view of the elevated threat level. Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, **Ministry of Education and Culture**

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39  The church has a taxation right through which it collects funds for its operations, including security measures.

3.  *Increasing the knowledge of religious communities* about what happens after hate crime is reported and how the matter proceeds from the police to the prosecutor and court[40]. Responsible parties: **National Police Board**, police departments.

4.  *Organising supplementary training for imams and responsible persons in religious communities.* The aim is to strengthen the knowledge of imams and community leaders in Finnish society and other social issues so they can support community members with correct, up-to-date information. The training includes information on fundamental rights, such as equality and gender equality as well as citizens' responsibility. Responsible parties: **Finnish National Agency for Education**, Islamic communities.

5.  *Increasing interaction and dialogue between religious communities.* Creating national and local procedures according to which religious communities are regularly summoned to discuss topical issues, including safety and security questions. They are alternately summoned by different communities, and experts, such as authorities' representatives, can be invited to the occasions, where necessary. Where possible, making use in the operations of cooperation structures already available. Responsible parties: **religious communities** locally and nationally.

6.  *Increasing interaction and dialogue between the authorities and religious communities* by regularly arranging round table discussions about topical and important issues. Responsible parties: **national and local authorities** and religious communities.

7.  *Increasing the participation of religious communities* in local cooperation by implementing the recommendations presented in the Ministry of the Interior report "Observations about the case management interface and recommendations for the development of operation" (2019:17). Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, non-governmental organisations and **authorities participating in local cooperation.**

8.  *Strengthening the competence of religious communities by arranging training* on the prevention of violent extremism and efforts to combat the impacts of polarisation and hate speech. Implementing a training package based on the principles and tools of peace work for religious communities, including training

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40  Example of how information can be disseminated: Poliisitube YouTube channel, Video on the criminal process and the stages of criminal investigation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_yt_44PdxXY.

on how to act as a peacemaker in local conflicts. Planning the training package in close cooperation with religious communities by offering a low-threshold, safe space for discussion, peer learning and cooperation. Responsible parties: **Finn Church Aid and the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers.**

9.  *Increasing confidence and strengthening cooperation by continuing* the concrete deployment of the operating models developed in the *Reach Out operation*[41] throughout the country. Responsible parties: **Finn Church Aid and the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers** together with the National Cooperation Network and local cooperation networks.

10. *Arranging training on religious literacy skills for authorities working with religious communities* and strengthening their knowledge and awareness of the role of the communities as a local partner and bridge builder. Responsible parties: **Finn Church Aid and the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers.**

11. *Increasing research-based knowledge* of the types of concerns and needs that Muslim communities have about violent radicalisation and security. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, researchers.

## 7.2.6 Taking into consideration the gender viewpoint in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism

Violent extremist groups have always had both male and female members. There has been more research in recent times into the roles of women in the groups and how violent radicalisation and extremism affects women and girls.

Women and girls are both the victims of violent extremist groups as well as active participants in them. They are subjected to sexual and other violence in areas where violent extremist groups operate. Globally, women are still more responsible than men for raising children and faced with the difficult task of raising and protecting children in areas where violent extremist groups operate and actively recruit young people into violent activities. In this sense, women can influence the next generation and how violent extremist ideas are passed on from one generation to another. Having a family can protect women against recruitment as women with a family cannot as easily as the men become fully devoted to the activities of violent organisations and promote their goals.

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41  Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalisation 2016, Measure 3.

Throughout history, women have been active actors in violent extremist groups. Their role in terrorist organisations and other violent groups depends on the organisation's ideology, culture and the environment in which it operates. Women have more typically participated in armed combat in far-left movements than in radical-Islamist Sunni organisations, which emphasise the traditional role of women, or in far-right movements and organisations. The motives and reasons why women join violent extremist movements or organisations are different from those of men. Women often became radicalised by their friends and relatives, and collectively by a group of friends, for example.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for the compilation and implementation of the UN Women, Peace and Security Action Plan (Resolution 1325) together with other actors. The Action Plan contains objectives and measures that strengthen women's participation in the prevention of violent radicalisation.

## Objectives

Increasing knowledge and awareness of the ways in which violent radicalisation and extremism affects girls and women in Finland and what can be done to support them in situations where they are subjected to the actions of violent extremist groups or to their influence. Increasing information to support prevention concerning the factors and motives leading to the radicalisation of girls and women and their joining violent extremist groups. Strengthening the participation of girls and women in the prevention of violent radicalisation.

## Measures

1.  *Conducting research into the involvement of girls and women in violent extreme movements in Finland.* The research provides information on the types of roles and tasks held by girls and women in the movements, the reasons why they join and support them, how recruitment takes place and the types of differences between extremist groups with respect to girls and women. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, researchers.
2.  *Promoting the participation of young women* in the planning and implementation of measures preventing violent radicalisation. Ensuring that the participants come from many different backgrounds. Responsible parties: **National Cooperation Network**, local cooperation and multi-professional groups.

### 7.2.7 Preventing radicalisation in prisons and reducing threats connected with released prisoners

Combatting violent radicalisation in prisons is a key objective in all EU Member States. Many individuals who committed a terrorist attack in Europe became radicalised while in prison. According to information collected by the European Commission on the EU Members States, almost 500 prisoners sentenced for terrorist crimes or having become radicalised in prison, were released in 2018 or will be released in 2019. In the future, their number will increase because the number of prisoners becoming radicalised in prison is estimated to grow. This is due to returnees from the conflict areas in Syria and Iraq as well as an increase in homegrown terrorism and radicalisation.

The Criminal Sanctions Agency carried out a project on the identification of violent extremism and radicalisation in 2016–2018. During the project, observations were made of more than 100 individuals, of which about 50 were serving a prison sentence. The operation was established as part of the Criminal Sanction Agency's agenda and its resources were increased in 2018–2019. In March 2019, a total of seven Criminal Sanction Agency's officials were working full-time to identify and prevent violent radicalisation.

The primary purpose of Health Care Services for Prisoners is to produce high-quality, correctly timed health care services for all prisoners in all prisons in Finland. Health Care Services for Prisoners meets every prisoner upon their entering prison and conducts an exhaustive health examination. Its role is to identify individuals of concern encountered in connection with their normal health care duties and to refer them to the appropriate services during imprisonment. The Act on the Health Care Services for Prisoners sets out the possibility to inform the Criminal Sanctions Agency of situations that could endanger the health or safety of the prisoner, their inmates or prison personnel, notwithstanding provisions relating to secrecy.

### Objectives

The aim is to identify radicalised prisoners, individuals radicalising other prisoners, prisoners in danger of radicalisation as well as customers serving a community sanction. Preventing the activities of individuals radicalising others. Targeting measures at individuals in danger of radicalisation in order to prevent their radicalisation. Targeting rehabilitative measures at all individuals showing signs of radicalisation. Measures can be imposed on persons released from prison and subject to probationary supervision that reduce the threat of terrorism they may pose. From the point of view of Health Care Services of Prisoners, early identification and proper referral to services are key goals.

**Measures**

1. *Ensuring a shared overview, flow of information and cooperation.* The management of the Criminal Sanctions Agency, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service and Health Care Services for Prisoners meet regularly once a year, summoned by the Criminal Sanctions Agency. The theme of the meeting is the situation in prisons with respect to violent radicalisation and the threat of terrorism, cooperation with released prisoners as well as making the necessary decisions about development measures. Regionally, representatives from the Criminal Sanctions Agency, the National Bureau of Investigation, local police, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service and Health Care Services for Prisoners meet regularly to discuss development needs and topical issues. Responsible parties: **Criminal Sanctions Agency**, National Police Board, National Bureau of Investigation, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, Health Care Services for Prisoners.

2. *Training and expertise.* Preventing violent radicalisation in prisons and interacting with released prisoners requires that sufficient, regular training is arranged for the personnel. Responsible party: **Criminal Sanctions Agency.**

3. *Identifying radicalisation.* Target persons and groups are subject to surveillance in order to identify radicalisation. The target persons can be ordinary prisoners, those serving life, remand or fine sentence as well as community sanction customers. Responsible party: **Criminal Sanctions Agency.**

4. *Reporting observations.* Officials of the Criminal Sanctions Agency report the concerns they have observed to officials, who are responsible for processing the information for the identification of radicalisation. Observations can be related to the behaviour of individuals, the atmosphere in the cell block or the property in the individual's possession. Responsible party: **Criminal Sanctions Agency.**

5. *Early prevention.* To prevent radicalisation, interactive work is done with customers in which individuals representing different cultures and religious backgrounds are met with dignity and in a culturally sensitive manner. Responsible party: **Criminal Sanctions Agency.**

6. *Dynamic security and continuous interaction with customers.* These play an important role in identifying and preventing radicalisation. Active interactive work is done with customers and convicted prisoners, with the aim of helping the authorities identify possible

changes in the individual's behaviour and support them in rejecting extremist ideology. Responsible party: **Criminal Sanctions Agency.**

7. *Dealing with radicalised and radicalising individuals.* If a person is considered to have become radicalised or to be in danger of radicalisation, their situation is assessed and they are subjected to customised measures to interrupt the development of radicalisation. The assessment is updated, where necessary. Responsible party: **Criminal Sanctions Agency.**

8. *Friday prayers.* According to Chapter 11, section 3 of the Imprisonment Act (767/2005), where possible, church services, devotional services and other religious events shall be arranged in a prison in accordance with the prisoners' needs. Prisoners shall be given the possibility to meet a pastoral counsellor or another representative of their own religion. Prisons shall have premises suitable for the practice of religion. As a rule, practicing Christianity in prisons is ensured, and some prisons have prison priests who belong to the Criminal Sanctions Agency's personnel. The opportunities for Muslim prisoners to practise their religion are not always adequate. The challenge is to ensure that the imams visiting prisons are mainstream Muslims and do not spread an interpretation urging violence. Developing procedures to enhance the right of Muslim prisoners to practise their religion and ensuring that the imams visiting prisons are mainstream Muslims. Responsible parties: **Ministry of Justice**, Criminal Sanctions Agency, representatives of Muslim communities.

9. *Preparing a manual or handbook to promote equality in the implementation of imprisonment, especially with a view to Muslim prisoners.* Responsible parties: **representatives of Muslim communities and authorities** together.

10. *Offering alternatives.* Means for self-development are offered to individuals in danger of radicalisation, with the aim of distancing them from factors sustaining radicalisation. Responsible party: **Criminal Sanctions Agency.**

11. *Measures taken by Health Care Services for Prisoners.* Identifying signs of radicalisation observed in connection with normal work and being able to refer individuals to appropriate services. Responsible parties: **Health Care Services for Prisoners,** Criminal Sanctions Agency.

12. *Actions taken before release from prison.* The release of a prisoner is planned in accordance with the statutory release plan. Among other things, the plan covers housing, education, job and family

situation.  For municipalities, it is important to receive information on radicalised released prisoners so they can plan the necessary support measures. In some cases, released prisoners return to reception centres and detention units. Support measures play a decisive role in the case of radicalised prisoners, as without them they may end up dealing with the same people they used be in contact with before imprisonment. The individual may have become radicalised by these people or may have acted as a radicaliser themselves. Responsible parties: **Criminal Sanctions Agency**, municipalities in which released prisoners settle down, reception centres.

13. *Dealing with released prisoners.* The Criminal Sanctions Agency provides the National Bureau of Investigation, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service and the police department of the prisoner's home municipality with information on the target persons who will be released from prison. Necessary cooperation between the authorities (local police, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, municipal social services, etc.) is arranged at every police department so that the situation with the target person to be released can be exhaustively assessed and monitored. Responsible parties: **Criminal Sanctions Agency**, National Bureau of Investigation, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, police departments, municipalities.

14. *Developing legislation.* The Finnish Immigration Service makes decisions about residence permits and granting citizenship. It is important that when making decisions, the Finnish Immigration Service has access to and can use all the information of relevance to decision-making. Currently, the data in the security information register can only be disclosed to the police, Defence Command, Finnish Customs and the Finnish Border Guard. Therefore, the criminal sanctions authorities cannot independently disclose data in the security information register to the Finnish Immigration Service. Legislation should be revised in this respect and allow the disclosure of such data to the Finnish Immigration Service. This also requires training the personnel of the Finnish Immigration Service in the processing of confidential information. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, the Finnish Immigration Service, Ministry of Justice.

15. *Ensuring that municipalities have sufficient information on organising services for persons who are released from prison and involve the risk of violent radicalisation.* According to the Ministry

of Social Affairs and Health, section 35 of the Social Welfare Act
can be applied in cases where a person of age returns to the
municipality from the conflict areas in Syria and Iraq. Investigating
whether municipal authorities can be informed under section 35
of the Social Welfare Act of persons to be released from prison and
involving the risk of violent radicalisation so that this can be taken
into consideration in assessing their service needs. Responsible
parties: **Ministry of Social Affairs and Health**, Criminal Sanctions
Agency, Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities.

### 7.2.8 Developing training and competence

The aim is that the prevention of violent radicalisation is based on research-based
knowledge and competence. Obtaining up-to-date information and maintaining
competence is challenging as the operations connect with the work of several authorities
and non-governmental organisations. The basic and supplementary education for
different professionals only include a few themes that would directly offer capabilities
to prevent violent radicalisation. On the other hand, it is important to note that good
education and professional skill as such also provide a good basis for this work. However,
the matter is often considered difficult and hard to tackle unless there is sufficient
confidence in having the necessary knowledge and competence about the subject.

Different authorities have organised training in the prevention of violent radicalisation.
A good example of training arranged by the police, which is based on good practices
developed in the EU. A broad training programme[42] has been implemented in the
education sector, and on-line training is being planned in social and health services about
the theme. In addition, seminars and training events have been arranged nationally and
by local cooperation networks. Finnish experts have participated in international training,
most notably the seminars and training arranged by the EU's Radicalisation Awareness
Network since 2011. The operation is carried out through sub-groups[43] of which there are
currently 10. The working groups also arrange common events.

Developing training as an important development target was taken up in the assessment
of the 2016 National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and

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42  Further information on the training programme can be obtained from the Expert network on extremist ideas
and resilience of the Faculty of Educational Sciences, the University of Helsinki.

43  The groups are as follows: RAN Communication and Narratives, RAN Education, RAN Exit, RAN Health and Social
Care, RAN local (local operation), RAN Prisons and Probation, RAN Police, RAN Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism,
RAN Youth, Families and Communities, RAN Young.

Extremism[44] . It was stated in the assessment that no clear goals or priorities have been set for the training of actors in the field. The resources available for the training of actors do not meet the needs of the provider of the training or the participants. In addition, training material is poorly available, especially for self-study purposes. It is recommended that the training of actors in the field should have clearer goals and priorities so that the limited resources can be targeted correctly. In addition, the planned web-based training and self-study packages could help in the situation.

## Objectives

Arranging regular training on the prevention of violent radicalisation for the authorities and other actors engaged in the work. Setting goals and priorities for training and implementing it nationally and for different sectors. Another aim is that matters related to the prevention of violent radicalisation can also be effectively taken up in connection with other training.

## Measures

1. *Confirming the goals and priorities of the training* in connection with preparing the annual National Action Plan. The goals and priorities cover both national and sectoral training, including locally arranged training. Responsible parties: **National Cooperation Network** and its members for their own sectors.

2. *Preparing an annual plan for national training* and applying for centralised funding for its implementation. Responsible party: **Ministry of the Interior.**

3. *Making sure that the various sectors annually arrange targeted, systematic training in the prevention of violent radicalisation* and provide financial support for it. The training targets set are taken into consideration in the training. Responsible parties: **Authorities participating in the implementation** of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism.

4. *Participating in RAN training.* Different sectors ensure, through the RAN contact point (Ministry of the Interior), that their representatives participate in training arranged by RAN. Providing information on the topics and other materials taken up in the training efficiently and systematically for use by other actors within

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44  Assessment of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism of the Ministry of the Interior. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:18.

the organisation. Responsible parties: **Ministry of the Interior**, different actors and non-governmental organisations.

## 7.3 Objectives and measures of the authorities participating in the implementation to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism

This chapter describes the objectives and measures of the implementing authorities to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism and to develop the work. The measures and objectives were prepared by the authorities themselves.

### 7.3.1 Prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism in social and health services

**Objectives**

Social and health services prevent violent radicalisation by promoting the health and wellbeing of their customers. Becoming subject to the influence of violent ideologies is combatted by strengthening psychological resistance or resilience. Violently radicalised individuals are encountered as part of customer work in social welfare services and in the various fields of health care. The most important development target in the sector is to identify individuals who have become or are in danger of becoming violently radicalised. Violent radicalisation and extremism are topics that call for special expertise and multi-professional skills in order to arrange and develop care and services.

Social and health care professionals help persons of concern individually and in a timely fashion with the help of their work community and the methods developed in the sector, together with other professionals or referring individuals to other services. It is also part of the professionals work to enhance the individual's sense of participation in order to strengthen their operating capacity over the sense of social exclusion. The safety and security of the person, their friends and relatives as well as society in general are strengthened at the same time. In social welfare services, the focus in preventive efforts is on adult social work, immigration services and especially basic and special services for families with children (including child welfare services and services for young people). In health care, emphasis is placed on pupil and student health care, including emergency care, psychosocial support and mental health services in acute cases. Any specific mental disorder or psychological profile is not known to be connected with violent radicalisation. However, becoming subject to the influence of violent ideologies or activities can

aggravate mental disorders. Mental disorders are slightly more common among single radicalised individuals than among the rest of the population. It may be possible to reduce the risk of radicalisation in care as it promotes the social skills of the patients, increases their networks, improves their ability to lead a meaningful daily life and reduces frustration.

## Measures

1. *Dealing with a person who has become or is in danger of becoming radicalised.* When encountering a person who has been or is facing the threat of being radicalised, social and health care professionals first investigate whether the case has signs of committing violent acts or urging others to commit them. If a threat of violence or instigation to it is observed, the social and health care professional first finds out whether the person or their friends and relatives can be assisted through means available to the professional or the work community or whether the person should be referred to the services of other authorities. Furthermore, it must be investigated which party should be informed of such signs and how. Social and health care professionals have the right to report to the police any information necessary for assessing a threat or act posed to people's life or health without prejudice to the confidentiality obligation. There are separate instructions for multi-professional Anchor teams operating in police departments. Responsible parties: **social and health care professionals.**

2. *Strengthening participation.* Multi-professional, multi-sectoral work plays a key role in preventive work. Social and health care actors participate in Anchor work. Ohjaamo guidance centres and workforce services support integration with the rest of society. Proper treatment of mental disorders in part supports the prevention of violent extremist ideas. It should be noted, however, that extremism is not a mental disorder and a mental disorder does not involve extremist violent ideas. Responsible parties: **social and health care professionals.**

3. *Preventing the violent radicalisation of children and young people.* The child's own environments, such as early childhood education and school, are important actors in prevention. Early childhood education is supported by maternity and child health clinics and family centres in the health care system. Student welfare and school health care services are available at schools, and student health care and student welfare services in tertiary education. If a child or

young person is suspected of having a mental disorder, they can be referred to more detailed examinations in specialised medical care. Approximately 20–25 per cent of young people suffer from mental disorders. Proper care of the mental disorder is of use when seeking to improve the individual's possibility to act as a member of their community and society. Responsible parties: **social and health care professionals.**

4. *The radicalisation of children and young people is a new phenomenon in Finland*, and there is not even international research-based proof of the use of different methods in their care. The principle in their care is the same as that for adults. The social support received by children, young people and their families affects the environment in which children are brought up. Where necessary, social welfare or non-institutional child welfare measures are targeted at the family. If needed, a child or young person can also be placed in a suitable growth environment where they can abandon violent ideologies and activities, supported with other specific support, where necessary. Responsible parties: **social and health care professionals.**

5. *Utilising the services of regional centres of expertise and support.* Services requiring highly demanding special expertise have been regionally focused in five centres of expertise and support (OT centres), from which the necessary services can be provided equally throughout the region. Support and care for helping children and young people reject a violent radicalisation process is very challenging and requires special expertise. Although most of the social and health care professionals do not encounter these children and young people in their work, it is important for them to know what to do if they do encounter them. Responsible parties: **social and health care professionals.**

6. *Increasing research-based knowledge.* Scientific research plays an important role in developing the operations, legislation in the field as well as the exchange of information. The Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare supports the identification of violently radicalised individuals as well as the development of suitable means of care and support through research and education. In addition, multi-professional cooperation is developed with the police, education sector and immigration authorities, for example. The research and investigations basically serve practical work, looks at the phenomenon and its impacts as well as assesses the

implementation of the chosen strategy. Responsible party: **Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare.**

7. *Preparing and providing online training and other supplementary training.* The Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare plans and prepares an online training package to support social and health care professionals and their partners, consisting of videos, inserts, background material, group work materials as well as questions for assessing learning. The training package also includes instructions and support material for arranging workshops and contact teaching days. The planned training is free of charge and can be used freely. Its use is assessed and it is updated regularly. Responsible party: **Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare.**

8. *Participating in international cooperation.* In the healthcare and social welfare sector, European-wide cooperation takes place through bilateral contacts and the sector's own Radical Awareness Network (RAN). There is also a Nordic RAN network in the healthcare and social welfare sector. Some of the research and development work on the theme is conducted with international partners. Responsible parties: **social and health care professionals.**

## 7.3.2 Prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism in the reception system

Reception centre customers may face the risk of violent radicalisation. They often come from areas with violence, including violence and hate between different population groups, as well as confrontation. Due to possible wars and long-lasting unrest, some of these customers may have no experience of living side by side in peace. Moving to another country does not always take away these experiences. They may be sustained by messages from relatives and friends in the former home country and news received from there. The above factors, possible disappointments experienced in Finland as well as uncertainty about the future can make some reception centre customers vulnerable to the propaganda of and recruitment by violent extremist groups.

### Objectives

The basic work done in the reception system is high quality and based on the common operating models shared by the Finnish Immigration Service and all reception centres, as well as on the regular guidance and training of the reception centre personnel.

The quality of the centres is consistent and their aim is to treat all customers equally. Customers with special needs are assisted and supported according to the possibilities available.

The observations made by the personnel about violent radicalisation, healthcare and social welfare services, guidance as well as an approach that takes account of security issues all help prevent violent radicalisation at an early stage. Close local cooperation between different authorities and actors promotes the earliest intervention in violent radicalisation possible, supports the work done in the centres and allows referring individuals also to services provided by outside service providers.

### Measures

1. *Training reception centre personnel* to identify violent radicalisation. Regularly training the reception centre personnel on the phenomenon and about the actions they should take in case of persons of concern. Making use of the expertise and knowledge of different experts in the training. Responsible parties: **Finnish Immigration Service**, reception centres.

2. *Training asylum seekers who have arrived in the country.* Each asylum centre resident aged over 16 years completes a basic course on Finnish society. The course provides the necessary basic information on living in a reception centre and the rights and obligations available while living there. It gives the customer initial information and also introduces them more broadly to Finnish society, its operating culture as well as how to act outside of the reception centre. The course promotes the asylum seekers' awareness of being part of and participating in Finnish society. Responsible parties: **Finnish Immigration Service**, reception centres.

3. *Strengthening work in reception centres.* Emphasising the importance of the early support provided by the reception centre personnel. Customers' needs are not necessarily limited to specific issues that should only be dealt with by a specific group of professionals. Multi-professional cooperation between employees, active observations and a proactive approach are central to the operations. Targeting special support measures as early as possible to persons of concern. Referring individuals to existing services provided by other authorities as well as private and public sector actors. Responsible party: **Finnish Immigration Service**, reception centres.

4. *Increasing cooperation with local authorities and other actors.* Encouraging and helping reception centres pursue local cooperation and create, together with the local authorities and other actors, cooperation models supporting and helping the reception centre customers. Responsible party: **Finnish Immigration Service**, reception centres.

5. *Reporting observations.* The reception centre personnel inform the local authorities of any activities causing concern in accordance with the agreed procedures and the confidentiality provisions in force. Accordingly, urgent cases are immediately reported to the number 112 and other cases to the local police. The local police forward the information to the appropriate authorities. The observations may concern violence, recruitment, violence based on extremist ideas, glorifying terrorism or other security threats. Responsible parties: **Finnish Immigration Service, reception centres**, local police.

### 7.3.3   Actions of the police to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism

The police are a key actor in preventing and combatting violent radicalisation and extremism. Their statutory duty is to maintain public order and safety and security as well as combat crime. Maintaining public order and safety and security includes maintaining a safe, pleasant living and operating environment as well as combatting and preventing disturbances and any violation of rights. These duties are closely connected with the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. The ability and skill of the police to prevent violent radicalisation has improved in the last few years. The unit for preventive action of the National Bureau of Investigation (Threats, TUPA and Internet intelligence functions) together with the preventive actions taken by the police departments make up a distinct entity for dealing with all individuals of concern.

The national strategy for preventive police work was confirmed in December 2018. It includes a confirmed strategic guideline according to which the police prevent violent radicalisation, extremism, the activities of extremist movements as well as hate crime. The goals and strategic guidelines of the strategy also promote measures that reduce the root causes and factors underlying violent radicalisation and extremism, such as increased confrontation between population groups, polarisation and origination of groups outside of society.

### Objectives

In their work, the police identify individuals who are at risk of being violently radicalised or who have already been radicalised and deal with them in the manner required by

the threat assessment. The police investigate tips and, where allowed by the legislation, give feedback to the whistleblower with the aim of strengthening the whistleblower's confidence about the proper handling of tips and about their leading to the necessary actions. Criminal intelligence plays an important role in the ability of the police to detect violent radicalisation. Police information systems are used effectively and comprehensively, based on legislation, for storing information, preparing analyses and forming a national overview. Visible actions by the police on the internet and other intelligence activities taking place there increase the possibilities for detecting violent radicalisation and intervening in it as early as possible.

The police effectively refer individuals facing the risk of radicalisation to services by implementing the operating method outlined in the Ministry of the Interior publication 2019:17 (Appendix 1). The police support other authorities and representatives of non-governmental organisations in actions related to the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism by providing expert assistance and advice.

The police participate in the work of local cooperation groups for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism and produce information, together with other authorities, for preparing a local threat assessment. The police target actions decided on in the national strategy for preventive work, especially in areas where violent extremist groups and related individuals have a negative impact on safety and security and sense of security of people and communities. Multi-professional Anchor teams operating in connection with police departments prevent violent radicalisation and implement actions through which a person who is at risk of violent radicalisation or who has already been radicalised is helped to reject violent activities and referred to other services, where necessary.

## Measures

1. *Ensuring that the guidelines issued by the National Police Board to police units* on the processing of tips concerning violence are known to all actors who need them in their work. The guidelines provide national, consistent procedures for processing and forwarding information and for determining the division of responsibilities between actors. Efficient use of the guidelines clarifies the operating processes crucial in view of the prevention of violent radicalisation. Responsible parties: **National Police Board**, police departments, National Bureau of Investigation.

2. *Developing the internal and external dissemination of information on violent radicalisation* with the aim of ensuring it is up to date and making it available to every actor who needs it in their work. Ensuring that the police unit personnel are familiar with the

procedures and know how to apply them. Responsible parties: **Police departments**, National Police Board, National Bureau of Investigation.

3. *Harmonising and clarifying the practices of police departments in preparing statistics on extremist crime.* The aim is that the practices are consistent with respect to whether acts committed during demonstrations are recorded as a single offence or several offences, for example. Instructions of the National Police Board for criminal matters to be reported to the prosecutor, the notification procedure and the prosecutor's actions (POL-2018-50728) are applicable to extremist crime with a political motive or a motive set out in Chapter 6, section 5(4) of the Criminal Code of Finland. Notification ensures the prosecutor's ability to take the needs of the criminal process into consideration in the fulfilment of criminal liability. Responsible parties: **National Police Board**, police departments.

4. *Taking an extremist motive into consideration in pre-trial investigation* with the aim of promptly completing the investigation of such a crime. Responsible party: **Police departments.**

5. *Developing and harmonising processes used to assess threats related to people and phenomena.* Responsible parties: **National Police Board**, police departments, National Bureau of Investigation.

6. *The police participate in the work of regional and local cooperation networks preventing violent radicalisation and extremism* and, where necessary, adopt a coordination and management responsibility for their work. Cooperation with different actors allows the creation of an overview and intervention at an early stage in phenomena that signal violent radicalisation. Cooperation is concrete, and case-specific processes are launched with the key actor in order to ensure effective prevention. Responsible parties: **Police departments.**

7. *Training the police in preventing polarisation* and in dealing with polarised situations. Responsible party: **National Police Board.**

8. *The investigation of hate crime, including punishable hate speech*, is enhanced and measures are taken to continue training the police in the identification and investigation of hate crime. Only a few victims of hate crime are referred to support services. The police promote referral to the services according to section 18 of the Criminal Investigation Act. Responsible parties: **National Police Board**, police departments.

9. *The police implement Exit activities throughout the country* with the aim of helping individuals break free from the influence of violent

extremist movements and organised crime. Responsible parties:
**National Bureau of Investigation**, police departments.

### 7.3.4 Prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism in the education sector

The education sector is a key actor supporting the wellbeing, development and learning of children and young people. Teaching and education comprehensively reach children and young people at the compulsory education age, and also widely individuals who participate in early childhood education, upper secondary and vocational education, as well as in basic education for adults. As the phenomena in society are also reflected in educational institutions and early childhood education, the education sector plays an important role in combatting social polarisation, racism and hate speech. Many of the viewpoints presented in this chapter can also be applied to higher education.

#### Objectives

The content, methods, and goals related to broad-based prevention are based on the national core curricula and are already an essential part of the daily operations of the education sector. However, according to research, there is still a considerable need to increase educators' knowledge about extremist ideologies and violent extremism as well as develop constructive prevention measures.

Phenomena related to violent radicalisation and extremism become visible and tangible in educational institutions in many ways, such as through the media, news and the experience and/or comments of learners or their families. Learners need knowledge and skills to process topical issues in order to understand and reflect the social phenomena around them. It is important to address issues featured in the media with children and young people to ensure that their understanding of such situations is based on facts and not imagination or biased interpretations.

The role of the education sector with regard to the prevention of violent extremism is multi-dimensional, as educational institutions play an important role in preventing the proliferation of violent extremist ideas at the broad, societal level. However, educators must also know how to address themes and events related to violent extremism with learners as they come up in everyday life. In addition, educational institutions are also in a position to identify the specific needs that students may have and guide the person of concern to the right service, as well as to act as a partner in the multi-professional cooperation network. These key dimensions are illustrated in the REDI-model below, which provides a framework for addressing, preventing and countering violent extremism in the education sector.

Dimensions 0 and 1 a-b refer to the general curriculum-based objectives of day-to-day educational practices that concern all educators, and more specifically to those skills and knowledge that are thought to support the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism, as well as other negative and harmful developments. Dimensions 2, 3 and 4 refer to specific situations where a learner's possible engagement with violent ideologies raises concern, and in which the educator acts as part of a multi-professional cooperation network.



**Figure 1. REDI-model for Supporting Resilience, Democracy and Dialogue Against Violent Radicalization and Extremism in Educational Institutions (Vallinkoski, Koirikivi & Benjamin 2019)**

## Overall prevention framework: dimensions guiding activities in the education sector

### Dimension 0: educator's self-reflection

**Objective:** The educator recognises their own values, worldviews/beliefs, intuitive responses and thinking styles, and understands the role these play in ways they interpret information and encounter learners.

It is important for all educators to recognise their own preconceptions and knowledge of the related phenomena, as these set preconditions for open, positive encounters with the learners, as well as for discussing themes related to violent extremism with learners. This dimension involves essentially the educator's awareness of their own knowledge base, life experiences, values and worldviews, as these act as a filter and lens for how the educator perceives different sets of values and ideologies, takes a stand towards them and interprets social phenomena. Therefore, it is important to strengthen educators' knowledge of the phenomena related to violent radicalisation and extremism, as well as of the goals that education aims to reach regarding the prevention of extremism at all levels of the education system.

With regard to educators' professional competence, it is important that they recognise and critically view their own values and worldviews and become aware of their intuitive responses to the themes linked to violent extremism. This, in turn, influences the types of thinking and actions they consider acceptable, normal and desirable. In particular, it is important for educators to consider the thoughts they have and the practices they adopt when encountering different learners, especially those whose backgrounds differ from their own. Educators should pay attention to how they address themes that are unfamiliar or foreign to them, and to the type of worldview they convey to learners through their choice of words, learning materials and content. Reaching the objectives of Dimension 1a, i.e. addressing themes related to violent extremism in a pedagogically and ethically sustainable way, requires educators to critically approach and reflect on the topics discussed through the evaluation of one's own worldview and the broader social context in which they operate.

### Dimension 1a: addressing extremism

**Objective:** To discuss unsettling events or controversial issues with learners in a pedagogically and ethically sustainable way.

The target group for dimensions 1a and 1b is the whole school community. Measures can be implemented by the educator alone or in collaboration with other actors within the educational institution, such as guardians, non-governmental organisations and the student welfare group.

It is important for educators to know that there are several background factors and mechanisms that can be related to violent radicalisation and extremism, such as the individual's mental wellbeing, perceived grievances, poor social relations or broader oppressive social structures. Therefore, radicalisation is not a question of a clearly defined phenomenon or process and there is no single factor (e.g. religion, social exclusion, mental problems, poverty or bullying) that alone would make a young person vulnerable to violent radicalisation. Maintaining this perspective is particularly important when discussing themes related to the phenomenon with learners.

When unsettling events committed by man (such as terrorist attacks) or controversial themes (which divide opinions and arouse strong emotions) are discussed with learners, it is important for the educator to avoid creating distorted images or strengthening stereotypes and threats. Learners must be given time and space to talk about their concerns, even though it is important to move forward in the discussion after this initial stage. It is important to discuss the topics according to the age of the learners, stick to facts (what is actually known about the event), present different viewpoints about the phenomenon and pay attention to the structures that strengthen learners' sense of security and control, such as the operations of rescue workers and other officials. The educator can support the development of learners' critical thinking by introducing different viewpoints and historical perspectives to the events, as well as by addressing questions related to political, geographical, religious or ethnic background factors. It is also important to guide the learners' attention to the different ways of coping with the given situation, to the sense of togetherness, solutions and alternative ways to act.  The educator should be aware that the way in which the same phenomena are discussed in homes, may vary considerably from that of the educational institution. Situations where the learner has to make a moral choice between the values or interpretations of the home and the school are especially sensitive. Such dilemmas should be addressed sensitively and by increasing learners' understanding of the different perspectives in play, while stressing that use of violence is always condemned.

The educator can also expand their resources to address different topics by studying different worldviews, as well as the ideologies underlying extremist groups. Increased understanding of violent extremism as a phenomenon can be obtained by becoming familiar with the processes, mechanisms and factors that may underlie extremism. Outlining these can help the educator not only discuss violent extremism and terrorism with learners (Dimension 1a), but also deal with situations where topics related to extremism suddenly emerge in everyday school life (Dimension 2).

## Dimension 1b: broad-based prevention of violent extremism (PVE)

**Objective:** To develop the operational culture and organisational practices of educational institutions in a manner that strengthens the resilience of learners and the entire school community.

A key issue in Dimension 1b, (broad-based prevention) is to create an operational culture and practices that support all children and young people in their participation, wellbeing and positive integration with society. According to research, positive relationships, a sense of belonging and self-regulation skills strengthen the individual's resilience, i.e. psychological endurance and their ability to maintain agency in difficult or stressful situations. Resilience has been found to balance out and mitigate the negative impacts of the risk factors in young people's lives and thus prevent not only violent extremism but also many other harmful developments. In education, resilience can be strengthened especially through practices that support learners' participation and possibilities to have an impact in their school community, as well as by supporting the development of cognitive and social skills in accordance with the objectives of Dimension 1b. As an alternative to violent extremist movements, it is also important to promote and practice the use of democratic, non-violent ways of making a change. The knowledge and skills presented in Dimension 1b strengthen the resilience of learners and school communities and also address the transversal competencies set in the curricula, and also correspond to the skills that are needed in the 21st century.

## Dimension 2: Reactive and selective prevention (CVE)

**Objective:** To identify learners who need support, to guide them towards support, to know the key partners and to work actively as part of a multi-professional cooperation network.

The measures introduced in Dimension 2 are targeted at learners whose thoughts or actions raise concern in the educator or whose appearance or behaviour exhibit alarming changes over time. In such situations, reactive and selective prevention measures are only targeted at persons of concern. Concern can be related to situations, such as where the learner shows by their comments or behaviour that they are clearly interested in a violent ideology or violent actions. Changes in behaviour, appearance or comments implying extremist thinking do not automatically mean that the learner is adopting a violent extremist ideology. However, in all cases, changes that raise concerns must always be taken seriously as they are symptoms that indicate the learner is unwell and needs support. Extremist ideas can stem from a variety of reasons, so guiding the learner toward psychosocial support is central. The person of concern needs to be supported with personal guidance and follow-up, which is offered not only by the educator but also by the school's student welfare team and/or youth workers, social and health care professionals

as well as different organisations. The learner's guardians must also be actively involved in the guidance and support work carried out. Guardians must be consulted at an early stage and informed of the support plans and the development of the situation in a constructive and collaborative manner.

Reactive and selective prevention refer to situations where the learner shows—for example, through their comments or behaviour—that they are interested in/support a violent ideology or threatens individuals or members of a group of people with violence. It is important for educators to distinguish joking and intentional provocation from situations that constitute a real threat. However, this can be challenging, especially in cases where learner groups change often and the educator does not meet an individual learner daily. The key factors at this stage are the educator's professional competencies in knowing and encountering their students, the educational institution's common operational culture, and early intervention. It is also important to present and talk about the use of democratic and non-violent means to make a change that respect human rights and offer an alternative to violent extremist movements.

## Dimension 3: Security threats and the required measures

**Objective:** To know the key partners and security instructions, and to act as part of a multi-professional cooperation network.

The changes observed in the learner's behaviour or actions in Dimensions 3 and 4 are so obvious that they impose a direct threat to the learner, as well as the sense of safety or security of the whole school community and/or society. In Dimensions 3 and 4, the measures targeted at the individual are determined on a case-by-case basis and the multi-professional cooperation network must include members of the police and the local Anchor team, for example. It should be noted that, whenever applicable, the procedures in Dimensions 2–4 are predominantly determined by the guidelines given by the municipality and by other official actors. In situations where the educator suspects that the learner constitutes a threat to themselves or others, they must always contact the school head as well as actors providing student welfare services, such as the school psychologist and/or school social worker. If the question is of an acute threat, the police must be contacted immediately. The confidentiality obligation in basic education does not prevent disclosing information to the police if there is reason to suspect that somebody is in danger of being subjected to violence.

## Dimension 4: Measures required by violent radicalisation

**Objective:** To know the key partners and act as part of a multi-professional cooperation network.

**Instructions of the Finnish National Agency for Education for crises:**

In the event of sudden crises, accidents, threats or danger, the actions to be taken by the educational institution are guided by the operating instructions for sudden crises, threats and dangers included in the school's common student welfare plan, i.e. by the crisis plan, the rescue plan required by the Rescue Act, and, for the school personnel, the occupational health and safety action plan required by the Occupational Safety and Health Act.

In cases where somebody in the school community or educational institute threatens with violence or behaves violently, rapid intervention is necessary. As a rule, violence and threats of violence must be dealt with by the police, and it is important that the entire staff is familiar with the school's operating instructions in such cases. The urgency of contacting the relevant actor must be assessed at the time of intervention, while ensuring the safety and security of all those involved in the situation. A protective network must immediately be constructed around the threatening person to protect them and the environment. It is for the police to assess the seriousness of the situation on the basis of their guidelines and to decide on the measures to be taken.

**Measures:**

1. *Increasing the basic knowledge of the education sector personnel:* Producing a 60-minute online lecture for educators, including the following themes: key concepts, ideologies, violent radicalisation as a phenomenon, related background factors, the REDI model, significance of PVE in education on a larger societal scale, the role of educators. Responsible parties: **Finnish National Agency for Education**, the Expert network on resilience and extremism coordinated by the Faculty of Educational Sciences, the University of Helsinki.

2. *Training key instructors.* Arranging regionally comprehensive supplementary training to create a network of regional key instructors who support educators in early childhood education, general education and vocational education. Responsible parties: **Finnish National Agency for Education**, the Expert network on resilience and extremism coordinated by the Faculty of Educational Sciences, the University of Helsinki.

3. *Increasing cooperation.* Increasing cooperation and the exchange of information between different actors, such as universities, universities of applied sciences, researchers and educational institutions. Sharing up-to-date information supporting the work of educational institutions through the website of the Finnish National

Agency for Education. Responsible parties: **Finnish National Agency for Education.**

4. *Continuing development work by participating in Nordic and international cooperation.* Continuing participation in international and Nordic cooperation by supporting Pan-Nordic teacher training projects, for instance. Responsible parties: **Finnish National Agency for Education.**

Text part for the teaching sector: Katja Vallinkoski, University of Helsinki; Saija Benjamin, University of Helsinki; Pia-Maria Koirikivi, University of Helsinki, in collaboration with the Finnish National Agency for Education.

# Appendix 1

## Experts who participated in the preparation of the National Action Plan

### National Cooperation Network

The National Cooperation Network acted as the steering group for the preparation of the National Action Plan in accordance with the decision on its preparation. The composition of the National Cooperation Network is as follows:

Tarja Mankkinen, Head of Development, Chairperson, Ministry of the Interior; Mika Junninen, Senior Specialist, Ministry of Justice; Pekka Metso, Ambassador, Inter-Cultural Dialogue Processes, Ministry of Justice; Elina Lemmetty, Ministry of Justice, Pirjo Lillsunde, Ministerial Adviser, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health; Merja Mikkola, Head of Development, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare; Heli Nederström, Counsellor of Education, Ministry of Education and Culture; Annika Finnberg, Senior Specialist, Criminal Sanctions Agency; Sami Peltovuoma, Senior Specialist, Criminal Sanctions Agency; Satu Honkala, Counsellor of Education, Finnish National Agency for Education (deputy Kristina Kaihari, Counsellor of Education, Finnish National Agency for Education); Anna Santaholma, Senior Researcher, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service; Teemu Metsäpelto, Chief Inspector, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service; Timo Kilpeläinen, Chief Superintendent, National Police Board (deputy Sami Ryhänen, Chief Superintendent, National Police Board); Pekka Heikkinen, Chief Superintendent, National Board of Police; Hannele Häkkinen, Senior Specialist, Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (deputy Anu Wikman-Immonen, Senior Specialist, Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities); Anneli Portman, Specialist, City of Helsinki (deputy Vesa Nevalainen, Head of Student Welfare, City of Helsinki); Konsta Korhonen, Senior Detective Superintendent, Oulu Police Department, Head of the local cooperation network in Oulu; Heikki Vähäkuopus, Head of the local cooperation network in Turku (deputy Ritva Jykelä, Director General, City of Turku); Jouni Perttula, Risk Management and Security Manager, City of Tampere, Head of the local cooperation network in Tampere; Milla Perukangas, Project Coordinator, Finn Church Aid (deputy Habiba Ali, Project Coordinator, Finn Church Aid); Matti Cantell, Specialist, Finnish Federation of Settlement Houses; Hunderra Ali Assefa, Nuoret Muslimit ry (deputy Adam, Nuoret Muslimit ry); Mina Bahmanpour, Member of the Board, Mahdin nuoret, Kosar Mahmoodi, Member of the Board, Forum of Muslim Youth and Student Organizations NMF (deputy Abdel Bettahar, Member of the Board, Forum of Muslim Youth and Student Organizations); Pazilaiti Simayijiang, Youth Against Violent Extremism.

### Workshop Grooming and recruitment 3 June 2019:

Katja Vallinkoski, University of Helsinki; Anneli Portman, City of Helsinki; Milla Perukangas, Finn Church Aid; Tommi Kotonen, University of Jyväskylä;, Konsta Korhonen, Oulu Police Department; Maarit Suhonen, Save the Children; Habiba Ali, Finn Church Aid; Merja Mikkola, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare; Hajar Mahdavi, Mahdin Nuoret; Tarja Mankkinen, Ministry of the Interior.

### Workshop Religious communities 19 June 2019:

Annika Finnberg, Criminal Sanctions Agency; Abbas Bahmanpour, Resalat Islamic Society; Anneli Portman, City of Helsinki; Anna Hyvärinen, Finnish Ecumenical Council; Stiven Naatus, National Church Council; Ann-Sofie Nyström, Finnish National Agency for Education; Hanne von Weissenberg, Tampere Diocese; Jouni Perttula, City of Tampere, Suaad Onniselkä, Vesala Comprehensive School, City of Helsinki; Ulla Siirto, National Church Council; Atik Ali, Finnish Muslim Network; Heikki Nenonen, Vicar of Haaga; Milla Perukangas, Finn Church Aid; Paula Kemell, Resalat Islamic Society; Pia Jardi, Islamic Council of Finland; Anas Hajjar, Islamic Council of Finland; Satu Honkala, Finnish National Agency for Education; Abdul Mannan, Islamic Society of Northern Finland; Elina Hellqvist, National Church Council; Teemu Pauha, University of Helsinki; Mustafa Kara, Islamic Society of Tampere; Pekka Heikkinen, National Police Board; Mina Bahmanpour, Mahdin Nuoret ry; Pirjo Lillsunde, Ministry for Social Affairs and Health; Arslan Taskin, Suomen Islamilainen Diyanet Yhdyskunta; Tarja Mankkinen, Ministry of the Interior; Susanna Sutinen, Ministry of the Interior.

### Workshop Young people 3 June 2019:

Katja Vallinkoski, University of Helsinki; Heli Nederström, Ministry of Education and Culture; Anneli Portman, City of Helsinki; Hajar Mahdavi, Mahdin nuoret ry; Oussama Yousfi, Helsinki Deaconess Institute; Ahmed Abdulkarim, Helsinki Deaconess Institute; Joel Linnainmäki, Finnish National Youth Council Allianssi; Essi Kurki, City of Helsinki; Ann-Sofie Nyström, Finnish National Agency for Education; Suvi Autiosaari, Pakolaisnuorten tuki ry; Abbas Bare, Pakolaisnuorten tuki ry; Abdulqaadir Mohamed, Pakolaisnuorten tuki ry; Konsta Korhonen, Oulu Police Department; Toni Kuoremäki, UN Youth of Finland; Katri Vainio, Finnish Somalia Network; Pia Koirikivi, University of Helsinki; Saija Benjamin, University of Helsinki; Milla Perukangas, Finn Church Aid; Annukka Kurki, Finn Church Aid; Habiba Ali, Finn Church Aid; Petteri Näreikkö, Changemaker; Merja Mikkola, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare; Yassine Yousfi, Muvenna Project; Ibrahim Sehic, Muvenna Project; Salman Galid, Forum of Muslim Youth and Student Organizations NMF; Tarja Mankkinen, Ministry of the Interior; Sara Latvus, Finn Church Aid; Mohamed Hassan, African Talent and Change Foundation.

**Education sector**

The section on the education sector was drawn up by researchers Katja Vallinkoski, Saija Benjamin and Pia-Maria Koirikivi from the University of Helsinki.

## Radicalisation in prisons and prisoners to be released (preparatory group):

Annika Finnberg, Criminal Sanctions Agency; Ritva Elomaa, National Bureau of Investigation; Jouni Niskanen, Helsinki Police Department; Mika Junninen, Ministry of Justice; Katja Nissinen, Helsinki Police Department; Sami Peltovuoma, Criminal Sanctions Agency; Antti Hyyryläinen, National Bureau of Investigation; Sami Ryhänen, National Police Board; Merja Mikkola, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare; Tarja Mankkinen, Ministry of the Interior.

## Workshop arranged in Oulu on 14 May 2019:

Elina Hyvönen, City of Oulu, Immigrant Services; Kari Broström, City of Oulu, Utility Services; Mikko Nissinen, City of Oulu, Educational and Cultural Services; Priyanka Sood, City of Oulu, Multi-Cultural Services; Petri Walter, Educational Consortium OSAO; Hannu Kokko, Finnish Immigration Service; Mirja Pikkarainen, Criminal Sanctions Agency, Oulu Assessment Centre; Juha Rautiainen, Criminal Sanctions Agency, Oulu Prison; Risto Ottavainen, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service; Vesa Hiltunen, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, Irmeli Korhonen, Oulu Police Department; Merja Rasinkangas, Oulu Police Department; Milla Kynkäänniemi, Oulun Police Department; Konsta Korhonen, Oulu Police Department; Tarja Mankkinen, Ministry of the Interior.

## Workshop arranged in Turku on 6 May 2019:

Habib Hasan, City of Turku; Petteri Iltanen, Criminal Sanctions Agency; Ritva Jykelä, City of Turku; Kimmo Kulmala, Southwest Finland Police Department; Irina Laasala, Criminal Sanctions Agency; Joni Lindeman, Finnish Defence Forces; Jyri Mikkola, City of Turku; Ilkka Myllymaa, Turku Adult Education Centre; Ann-Sofie Nyström, Finnish National Agency for Education; Miia Nääppä, City of Turku, Anchor Team; Milla Perukangas, Finn Church Aid; Mika Salonen, Southwest Finland Police Department; Janne Sundqvist, Turku University of Applied Sciences; Reetta Vainio, Southwest Finland Police Department; Sari Vanhanen, Migration Institute of Finland; Taina Viljanen, Diakonia Centre; Jarno Virjonen, Finnish Red Cross; Heikki Vähäkuopus, City of Turku; Märit Welin, City of Turku; Anu Parantainen, City of Turku; Marikki Sjöström, City of Turku; Mika Ranta, Turku cooperation network for the prevention of violent extremism; Ibrahim Sehic, Muvenna Project, Yassine Yousfi, Muvenna Project.

**Workshop arranged by the National Police Board on 12 June 2019:**

Jarno Saarinen, Southeast Finland Police Department; Mikko Uusimäki, Ostrobothnia Police Department; Harri-Pekka Pohjolainen, Eastern Finland Police Department; Petteri Liimatainen, Häme Police Department; Tuomas Korhonen, Inland Finland Police Department; Hannu Väänänen, Western Uusimaa Police Department; Teemu Huttunen, Southwest Finland Police Department; Lauri Nikula, Oulu Police Department; Jarmo Heinonen, Helsinki Police Department; Sami Suosalmi, Eastern Uusimaa Police Department; Reko Silvenius, Lapland Police Department; Tarja Mankkinen, Ministry of the Interior.

**Researcher workshop 14 June 2019:**

Pia-Maria Niemi, University of Helsinki; Ann-Sofie Nyström, Finnish National Agency for Education; Suaad Onniselkä, City of Helsinki; Teemu Pauha, City of Helsinki; Anneli Portman, City of Helsinki; Juha Saarinen, Kings College, London; Daniel Sallamaa, University of Helsinki; Anna Santaholma, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service; Karri Soppi, Finnish National Agency for Education; Teemu Tammikko, Finnish Institute of International Affairs; Lotta Tuomaala-Järvinen, City of Helsinki; Kati Vahtera, Finnish Immigration Service; Katja Vallinkoski, University of Helsinki; Leena Malkki, University of Helsinki; Tarja Mankkinen, Ministry of the Interior.

# Appendix 2

## Description of the case management process, from tip-off to support

**1.**
**Concern aroused?**

- Family, relatives and friends
- Authorities' actions
- reports of offences
- child welfare report
- health and social services
- educational system

**2. Reporting the concern to the local Anchor team through the police**
the customer is invited to a meeting

**3.**
**Anchor work**
**the police, social services, health care and youth work**

multi-professional expertise
meeting the customer
service need mapping
threat assessment
information and routes to services,
"one-stop-shop" principle

**4.**
**Guidance**

Basic services
Health and wellbeing
Mental health
Family and youth work

Organisations
Crisis work
Violence work
Youth work
Special groups
Psychosocial support
low threshold
flexible connection

Religious
communities
mental support
counselling
a shoulder to lean on
sense of community

# Appendix 3

## Abbreviations and terms used in the Action Plan

Ideology
In violent extremism, violence is used, instigated, encouraged or justified on the basis of ideological grounds. In this Action Plan, ideology refers to a worldview that is common to a specific group of people and stems from attitudes about groups of people, the world, religion, relations between people and states, human dignity, what is sacred and what is profane as well as corresponding beliefs that constitute a moral compass for an individual.

Anchor work
Anchor work involves multi-professional activities that have been pursued since the early 2000s. Anchor teams work in connection with police departments in different parts of the country. The work involves the police, social sector, health services, the education sector and often also youth services. It is targeted at children and young people under 18 years of age to promote their wellbeing and prevent crime. Anchor work seeks to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism without age limits. According to a survey conducted in 2018, approximately 200 professionals from different fields participate in Anchor work.

CTED
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. Pursuant to UN Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), a body assisting the UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee that implements the Security Council's decisions, prepares country estimates in the UN Member States about their implementation of anti-terrorism resolutions and supports the Member States in combatting terrorism.

Daesh
A terrorist organisation operating in Iraq and Syria, with networks extending to Europe, Asia, Africa and America. Also known by the abbreviations IS, ISIS and ISIL.

OSCE
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

EU
European Union.

CE
Council of Europe. A political cooperation and human rights organisation in Europe.

EXIT operation
An action plan supporting persons who want to reject violent extremist ideologies.

Human rights
Human rights are written in international human rights agreements. The Finnish Government has promised to secure these rights for its citizens and everyone living in Finland.

Indoctrination
Indoctrination means activities through which a person is subjected to teaching and is only taught specific doctrines or ideas. The person has no possibility or capacity to independently assess the content of the teaching. The term is related to brainwashing and ideological influence.

IS
Islamic State. A terrorist organisation operating in Iraq and Syria, with networks extending to Europe, Asia, Africa and America. Also known by the abbreviations ISIL, ISIS and Daesh.

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| ISIL | Islamic State in Iraq and Levant. A terrorist organisation operating in Iraq and Syria, with networks extending to Europe, Asia, Africa and America. Also known by the abbreviations IS, ISIS and Daesh. |
| ISIS | Islamic State in Iraq and Levant. A terrorist organisation operating in Iraq and Syria, with networks extending to Europe, Asia, Africa and America. Also known by the abbreviations IS, ISIS and Daesh. |
| KAVI | National Audiovisual Institute. |
| NBI | National Bureau of Investigation. |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation. |
| MIGRI | Finnish Immigration Service |
| Nordic Safe Cities | Nordic Safe Cities is a network that broadly involves cities in different Nordic countries. One of its aims is to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism that threatens the safety, security and tolerance of cities and their inhabitants and also seeks to undermine Nordic values and social cohesion. |
| MEC | Ministry of Education and Culture. |
| MJ | Ministry of Justice. |
| FNAE | Finnish National Agency for Education. |
| Fundamental rights | |
| | Fundamental rights refer to rights in the Constitution of Finland. They are fundamental values and important to everyone. Fundamental rights guarantee for everyone the right to life. Fundamental rights include the right to personal freedom and integrity, freedom of movement, freedom to protect private life, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association and the freedom of religion. |
| NPB | National Police Board. |
| RAN | Radicalisation Awareness Network operating in connection with the EU. |
| CSA | Criminal Sanctions Agency. |
| Resilience | Resilience refers to flexibility and the ability to cope with changes. It can also mean resistance to attempts of influence, for example. |
| SOTE | Healthcare and social welfare services. |
| MI | Ministry of the Interior. |
| MSAH | Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. |
| FSIS | Finnish Security and Intelligence Service. |
| NIHW | Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare. |
| Dialogue/interaction between religions | |
| | The aim of dialogue between religions is to increase understanding between people who represent different cultures and religions and to reduce radicalisation and strengthen social order. |
| Hate crime | Hate crime is crime targeted at a person, group, a person's property, institution or a representative of these, motivated by prejudice or hostility towards the victim's real or perceived ethnic or national origin, religion or belief, sexual orientation, gender identity or appearance or disability. The Criminal Code of Finland does not contain a definition of hate crime or racist crime. However, the racial hatred motive of a crime, which in 2011 was also extended to cover other hate motives, has been taken into |

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|  | consideration as grounds for increasing the punishment (Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 6, section 5(4), 13 May 2011/511). In addition to grounds for increasing punishment, the legislation also refers to some offences whose constituent elements include a hate motive. Such crimes are discrimination, ethnic agitation and aggravated ethnic agitation. |
| HCSP | Health Care Services for Prisoners. |
| Violent extremism | Violent extremism refers to using, threatening, instigating, encouraging or justifying violence on the basis of ideological grounds. |
| Violent radicalisation |  |
|  | Violent radicalisation is a process through which individuals end up using or threatening with violence, urging someone to commit acts of violence or justifying it on ideological grounds. During the radicalisation process, the individual begins to accept and favour violence, regardless of the ideology or stimuli adopted from different ideologies that they use to justify violence. |
| UN | United Nations. |

Ministry of the Interior
Finland